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2501 
ARTICLE  
CONVICTIONS AS GUILT 
Anna Roberts* 
 
A curious tension exists in scholarly discourse about the criminal legal 
system.  On the one hand, a copious body of work exposes a variety of facets 
of the system that jeopardize the reliability of convictions.  These include 
factors whose influence is pervasive:  the predominance of plea bargaining, 
for example, and the subordination of the defense.  On the other hand, 
scholars often discuss people who have criminal convictions in a way that 
appears to assume crime commission.  This apparent assumption obscures 
crucial failings of the system, muddies the role of academia, and, given the 
unequal distribution of criminal convictions, risks compounding race- and 
class-based stereotypes of criminality.  From careful examination of this 
phenomenon and its possible explanations, reform proposals emerge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The way in which we speak about the criminal legal system is often in 
tension with the way in which we speak about those who have been through 
it.1  Facets of the system that jeopardize its reliability often seem to be 
forgotten when we speak of those with convictions; legal guilt (which I use 
here to mean conviction) often seems to provoke an assumption of factual 
guilt (which I use here to mean commission of the crime).  Thus, even when 
we urge more favorable treatment of those with convictions—that they 
should receive a second chance, redemption, rehabilitation, and so on—we 
risk obscuring flaws in the conviction-production process and reinforcing 
harmful stereotypes about where guilt resides. 
Who is “we”?  In previous scholarship, I have written about assumptions 
of guilt, and assumptions about the meaning of convictions, on the part of 
 
 1. For more information about the phrase “criminal legal system,” see infra note 407 and 
accompanying text. 
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police officers,2 jurors,3 judges,4 defense attorneys,5 legislators,6 
prosecutors,7 and members of the public.8  One can only point elsewhere for 
so long.  In this Article, I focus on the role of legal scholars.  Some who work 
within the criminal system may be constrained in their ability to question the 
reliability of convictions.9  But the scholarly role is surely different and 
critically important. 
Legal scholars have, on the one hand, generated an expansive literature 
exploring factors that can jeopardize the reliability of convictions as markers 
of factual guilt.  These factors include those that are identified by innocence 
scholars as the primary contributing causes of “false convictions.”10  But they 
extend further, into areas more central to this Article’s focus.  Whereas the 
“Innocence Movement” has focused on “wrong-man convictions,”11 scholars 
have pointed out that one can be factually innocent of a crime for a number 
of reasons other than being the “wrong man.”12  One may be the right man, 
to the extent that there is one, but lack the mens rea (mental state) that 
constitutes part of that crime.13  One may be the right man but have a winning 
 
 2. See Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony:  Prior 
Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 
865–66 (2016). 
 3. See Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness:  Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1503, 1530 (2015) [hereinafter Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness]; Anna Roberts, 
Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 2015 (2016) [hereinafter Roberts, 
Conviction by Prior Impeachment]. 
 4. See Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 998 (2019). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 586 
(2014). 
 7. Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors:  Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of 
Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359, 1404 (2012). 
 8. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1018–19. 
 9. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?:  On Judicial Proof and the 
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1985) (“Successful projection of a 
legal rule depends on a court’s ability to cast a verdict not as a statement about the evidence 
presented at trial, but as a statement about a past act—a statement about what happened.”); 
see also Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions:  Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1393 (1997) (“[A]n adjudicatory system has 
to operate on the premise that those duly convicted are guilty.”); id. at 1334 (“Even if innocents 
are convicted, the criminal justice system cannot formally acknowledge this because it will 
undermine society’s faith in the system.”). 
 10. See Samuel Gross, What We Think, What We Know, and What We Think We Know 
About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 772 (2017) (discussing mistaken 
witness identification, false accusation, false confession, forensic evidence, and official 
misconduct). 
 11. See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1157 n.1 (2010) 
(offering definitions of the Innocence Movement); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 
N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2011). 
 12. See Erik Lillquist, Balancing Errors in the Criminal Justice System, 41 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 175, 184 (2008). 
 13. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1327–28 (explaining that the narrow definition of 
innocence as “‘factual innocence,’ meaning that the defendant was not the perpetrator . . . 
leaves out several important categories of convicted innocents, such as those lacking the 
appropriate mens rea, those possessing a complete defense, and those erroneously convicted 
in an error-free trial”). 
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affirmative defense.14  This Article focuses on two facets of our system that 
are recognized within legal scholarship as jeopardizing the reliability of 
convictions even if the right man might be on the hook:  the predominance 
of the guilty plea and the subordination of the defense. 
The incentives that tend toward guilty pleas,15 and the lack of safeguards 
involved in the plea process,16 create a significant risk of convictions 
incurred in the absence of factual guilt.17  The proportion of convictions that 
are the product of guilty pleas—as high as 97 percent in some courts18—
illustrates the importance of this concern.  In both plea bargaining and the 
trial process, the subordinate status of defense representation—in areas that 
include caseloads, resources, standards, and incentives—creates a significant 
risk that convictions will be imposed in the absence of guilt.  Again, given 
the prevalence of defense representation (including indigent defense 
representation),19 the reach of this issue is immense.  Indeed, where there is 
no defense representation, defendants may be still more vulnerable. 
The scholarship highlighting these two factors (plus the scholarship 
focused on those factors more commonly associated with “innocence”) 
should reveal the problematic nature of an assumption that convictions 
connote crime commission.  Of course, one cannot come up with a figure that 
quantifies a “mismatch” between crime commission and crime conviction.20  
To answer the question of whether a crime occurred requires not only 
detailed knowledge of the law but also detailed knowledge of the facts.  In 
 
 14. See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 21 (2019) (“Possible bars to 
conviction include alcoholism, alibi, amnesia, authority to maintain order and safety, 
brainwashing, chromosomal abnormality, consent, convulsion, custodial authority, defense of 
habitation, defense of others, defense of property, de minimis infraction, diplomatic immunity, 
domestic (or special) responsibility, double jeopardy, duress, entrapment, executive immunity, 
extreme emotional disturbance, hypnotism, immaturity, impaired consciousness, 
impossibility, incompetency, insanity, intoxication (voluntary and involuntary), involuntary 
act defenses, judicial authority, judicial immunity, justification, law enforcement authority, 
legislative immunity, lesser evils, medical authority, mental illness (apart from insanity), 
military orders (lawful and unlawful), mistake (of law and fact), necessity, official 
misstatement of law, parental authority, plea bargained immunity, provocation, public duty or 
authority, reflex action, renunciation, self-defense, somnambulism, the spousal defense to 
sexual assaults and theft, statute of limitations, subnormality, testimonial immunity, the 
unavailable law defense, unconsciousness, and withdrawal.”). 
 15. See David Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 
27, 39 (1984). 
 16. See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
1065, 1114 (2015) (arguing that plea bargaining “offers no protection for the innocent”). 
 17. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 
ALB. L. REV. 919, 939 (2016) (stating that the American legal system, which “makes it in the 
interest of defense attorneys as well as prosecutors and judges to convince defendants to plead 
guilty,” is “nearly perfectly designed to convict the innocent”). 
 18. See U.S. District Courts―Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Method of 
Disposition, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table5.04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7MDU-E92L] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 19. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later:  Wrongful 
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 835–36 (2010).  
My thanks to Michael Risinger for particularly helpful discussions on this point. 
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addition, it frequently requires normative judgment21 and, thus, whether a 
crime occurred may be unknowable in an objective sense.22  But the inability 
to quantify these concerns should not lead to the conclusion that they are 
nugatory.23 
And yet, legal scholarship often proceeds as if these facets of the system, 
and the concern that they should provoke, do not exist.24  Legal scholarship 
often seems to present those with convictions as if they can be assumed to be 
factually guilty.  Thus, one finds explicit statements about the prevalence of 
guilt, the reliability of convictions, and the relatively small (or at least 
calculable) proportion of convictions that are wrongful.25  One also finds 
statements about the criminal system, and those convicted under it, that risk 
conveying an implicit message that convictions can be assumed to 
correspond to lawbreaking.26 
 
 21. See D. Michael Risinger, Searching for Truth in the American Law of Evidence and 
Proof, 47 GA. L. REV. 801, 812 (2013) (“[S]ome issues are not, in the end, facts at all but rather 
particularized value judgments”); id. at 828–29 (“Take negligence, for one.  The conclusion 
that an act (or failure to act) was negligent is a value judgment organized around such notions 
as ‘reasonable person’ and ‘careful enough.’  If we had a full color, full feel, full smell 
hologram of the events alleged to constitute ‘negligence,’ complete with a cap that would 
induce experience of the conscious subjective states of the actors from instant to instant, we 
would still need some mechanism to make the normative judgment.  In such cases the jury 
acts, under official delegation and warrant, not only as factfinder but also as the source of 
normative judgment.”); id. at 832 (“Most state-of-mind judgments that we expect juries to 
make, such as negligence, recklessness, or insanity, carry a more or less explicit normative 
warrant.”). 
 22. As John Mitchell puts it, 
[t]here are cases where factual and legal guilt merge.  You may know all the facts 
in a self-defense case, but whether the defendant was ‘reasonable’ or not in 
employing the force he did will be a conclusion of the trier of fact.  On the other 
hand, whether he was ‘reasonable’ will be central to the question of his factual guilt. 
John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers to Old 
Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 296–98 n.12 (1980); see also Gary Goodpaster, On the 
Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 130 (1987) 
(“[T]he kind of historical fact with which the law is concerned may not even exist in any 
meaningful way independent of the method of proof.”); Shapiro, supra note 15, at 44 (“[S]uch 
matters as state of mind are so subjective and ephemeral that it is hard to speak of a reality 
distinct from the finding of the trier of fact.”). 
 23. See Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 47 GONZ. 
L. REV. 251, 264 (2011/12) (“Conviction rates are not a valid proxy for commission rates.”); 
see also Keith Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 912 (2011/12) 
(noting that “[i]f one were asked to start from scratch and devise a system best suited to 
ascertaining the truth in criminal cases,” “[i]t is inconceivable that one would create a system 
bearing much resemblance to the criminal justice process we now have in the United States”). 
 24. See Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 
146 (2011) (“The prospect of error is generally ignored or denied by those entrusted with 
governing the criminal justice system, and is not adequately recognized in the scholarly 
debate.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Paul Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate?:  
Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom About the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60 
ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 847 (2018) (“To avoid any suggestion of false precision, the wrongful 
conviction rate might be stated as a range . . . of 0.016% to 0.062%.”). 
 26. See infra notes 304–18 and accompanying text. 
2506 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
One thing that complicates the project of highlighting this issue within 
one’s own field is that some of the statements that could be read as taking 
factual guilt as a given are made by scholars pushing for much-needed reform 
and reframing.  So, for example, scholars advance the propositions that all 
those with convictions should have a chance at rehabilitation and 
redemption,27 that character is not static,28 that poverty is criminogenic,29 
and that we need more “lenient” treatment not just of “non-violent drug 
offenders”30 but also of “violent offenders”31 and “sex offenders.”32  They 
assert that “sex offenders” and “juvenile offenders” should not be subjected 
to permanent exile33 and that maybe adult offenders more generally should 
not be.34  After all, they say, the “recidivism” rate of “sex offenders”—
viewed as a crucial bit of data—is less “frightening and high” than is often 
feared.35  They emphasize the centrality of the problem of 
overcriminalization.36  Of the misdemeanor system, they say that it delivers 
“assembly-line justice” rather than accurate adjudication.37 
Much of this is true, important, and a needed response to the kind of 
primitive attitudes that preceded it and survive it.38  And yet, when we speak 
 
 27. See, e.g., Regina Austin, “The Shame of It All”:  Stigma and the Political 
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 173, 180 (2004). 
 28. See infra note 307 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. 
REV. 259, 271 (2018) (describing the “non-violent” drug offender as the “poster child” of those 
concerned about “overcriminalization” and “overincarceration”). 
 31. Valuable work has been done, for example, in pointing out that the “violence” required 
for something to be classified as a “violent offense” falls considerably short of mainstream 
conceptions of “violence.” See, e.g., id. at 313.  Even as important points are made about the 
messiness, error, and ambiguity in deciding who is which kind of offender, one can sometimes 
lose track of similar vulnerabilities in deciding who is an offender in the first place. 
 32. See, e.g., Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation:  A Situationist 
Critique, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 56 (2017). 
 33. See, e.g., id. (“If Graham and Miller are to be taken seriously, courts and policymakers 
may not deliver juvenile offenders into permanent exile without considering the social context 
in which they committed their crimes.”); Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone:  Sex Offenders 
and the Ten-Percent Solutions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 607, 614 (2009) (asserting “a need for rational 
discourse that truly focuses on protecting children and the larger public from dangerous sex 
offenders without trampling on the Constitution and common sense in the process”). 
 34. See Binder & Notterman, supra note 32, at 56 (“Extending the same standard of 
decency to adult offenders is the next frontier of Eighth Amendment sentencing 
proportionality.”). 
 35. See Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”:  The Supreme Court’s 
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 496, 500–05 (2015). 
 36. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1358 (2012) (stating 
that in criminal law, the “traditional story has been destabilized by the overcriminalization 
critique”). 
 37. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 611, 619 (2014) (stating that “[t]he classic criticism of lower courts is that they 
delivery ‘assembly-line justice’” (quoting Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the 
Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 551, 586 (1997))). 
 38. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration:  Beyond the New Jim 
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 49 n.106 (2012) (“Ronald Reagan provides an example of the 
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without complication about “offenders,” their “recidivism,”39 their 
redemption, and their rehabilitation; when we emphasize the harms being 
wrought by overcriminalization;40 and when we portray character or poverty 
as causes of crime, we risk reinforcing the notion that conviction and crime 
commission are the same thing.  When we wrangle about how severely to 
punish different categories of “offenders,” we may seem to take for granted 
that all are “offenders” in a factual as well as legal sense.  When we 
emphasize the extent to which misdemeanor convictions track something 
other than factual guilt, we risk suggesting that, in the felony context, we 
need not be significantly concerned vis-à-vis the relationship between 
conviction and factual guilt.41  And when we speak of those without 
convictions as having lived law-abiding lives,42 we risk endorsing a flip-side 
assumption that absence of conviction equals factual innocence. 
If there is indeed a tendency to fuse legal and factual guilt once convictions 
are imposed, it is important to understand why that might be.  Some internal 
tendencies pushing in that direction may be widely shared.  One may yearn 
for clarity, simplicity, finality, safety, and to be at peace with the systems in 
which one lives.43  To equate crime conviction with crime commission may 
serve those desires.  Combined with those internal forces are external ones, 
such as education and media,44 which reinforce this fusion.  From as early as 
arrest, the media imparts messages of guilt,45 which by the point of 
 
point of view to which progressives are reacting:  ‘Choosing a career in crime is not the result 
of poverty or of an unhappy childhood or of a misunderstood adolescence; it’s the result of a 
conscious, willful, selfish choice made by some who consider themselves above the law, who 
seek to exploit the hard work and, sometimes, the very lives of their fellow citizens.’”). 
 39. See, e.g., Binder & Notterman, supra note 32, at 41 (“The most important assumption 
of penal incapacitation is that past offenders are likely to reoffend.”); Cecelia Klingele, 
Measuring Change:  From Rates of Recidivism to Markers of Desistance, 109 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 769, 769 (2019) (“Accepting recidivism as a valid, stand-alone metric imposes 
on the criminal justice system a responsibility beyond its capacity, demanding that its success 
turn on transforming even the most serious and intractable of offenders into fully law-abiding 
citizens.”). 
 40. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1358–59 (describing the overcriminalization critique 
and identifying some features that it lacks). 
 41. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia A. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013) (“Every day in thousands of 
courtrooms across the nation, from top-tier trial courts that handle felony cases to municipal 
courts that serve as cash cows for their communities, the right to counsel is violated.  Judges 
conduct hearings in which poor people accused of crimes and poor children charged with acts 
of delinquency appear without lawyers.  Many plead guilty without lawyers.  Others plead 
guilty and are sentenced after learning about plea offers from lawyers they met moments 
before and will never see again.  Innocent people plead guilty to get out of jail.”); Alice 
Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 569 (2018) (noting that 
“some critics of misdemeanor jurisprudence hold out felony jurisprudence as a salutary 
alternative representing criminal law at its best”). 
 42. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 990 (2013) (“[Expungement] laws recognize that a person should 
not be forever judged and burdened by his or her criminal record.  Thus, the laws benefit those 
who have demonstrated a commitment to living a law-abiding life.”). 
 43. See infra notes 336–39 and accompanying text. 
 44. See infra note 359 and accompanying text. 
 45. See generally Roberts, supra note 4. 
2508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
conviction, are powerful.  Even in discussions of “innocence,” it may be that 
the high-profile “wrongful conviction,” for all its awfulness, reinforces the 
notion that the others are rightful.46  After all, if (as is commonly declared) 
convictions involve proof beyond a reasonable doubt,47 and if (as is 
commonly declared) our system errs in favor of freeing the innocent,48 there 
must not be too much to worry about. 
Some additional trends may be felt particularly intensely by those within 
legal academia.  To be in legal academia is (with exceptions) to have a law 
degree, to be successful, and to lack a criminal record.49  Truly to stare at and 
acknowledge the inadequacy of defense representation, and fully to 
contemplate its implications, might leave those of us who have law licenses, 
but who focus on work other than alleviating the representation gap, 
uncomfortable.50  There are disincentives, too, to asking provocative 
questions about the existing distribution of criminal convictions and the 
extent of their accuracy.  After all, the status quo has kept us (generally) 
successful and conviction-free, despite the assumed prevalence51—some say 
universality52—of crime commission. 
There are several reasons to be concerned about this potential obscuring 
of the extent to which convictions fail to connote crime commission.  The 
first pertains to the function of legal scholarship.  Our role matters in regard 
to the criminal system.  We are here not to perpetuate state-supported 
portrayals of the system but rather to perform and model more complex tasks, 
such as questioning binaries and grappling with uncertainty.  Additional 
reasons relate to the consequences for others.  Detecting and responding to 
 
 46. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 612 (“Wrongful convictions scholarship and advocacy 
is premised on the idea of a rightful conviction.”). 
 47. See infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra note 410 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions:  Learning from 
Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 14 (2009) (“The typical path to the law professoriate 
is either through legal practice or a series of status markers based on one’s performance as a 
law student (good grades and law review, leading to a prestigious judicial clerkship and an 
impressive first job).”). 
 50. See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the Death Penalty:  “Old Sparky’s” 
Jolt to the Legal Profession, 14 PACE L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (noting lawyers’ role as “guardians 
of justice” and arguing that all lawyers should do something to respond to the 
disproportionality of resources between the government and the defense in death penalty cases 
and the “enormous” professional ethics concerns that are implicated). 
 51. See Michael J. Coyle, Transgression and Standard Theory:  Contributions Toward 
Penal Abolition, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 325, 331 (2018) (“[M]ost people habitually 
violate the law, and whether on the job, at home or on the street, commit a variety of both 
violent and non-violent ‘crimes’ in their lifespan.  One counting of such empirical data claims 
that in the U.S. more than 90% of all Americans have committed at least one ‘crime’ for which 
they could be incarcerated.” (citations omitted)). 
 52. See Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 491, 498 (2019) (“Everything is a crime, and everyone is a criminal.  (Well, 
almost.)  That has become the refrain among a growing chorus of critics who decry the 
phenomenon of ‘overcriminalization.’”); L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, You Commit Three 
Felonies a Day, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2009, 11:09 AM), wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704471504574438900830760842 [https://perma.cc/9MEV-74MU]. 
2020] CONVICTIONS AS GUILT 2509 
criminal wrongdoing is a core function of the criminal system.53  If that core 
function is failing, to an unknown but potentially large extent, that ought to 
be made clear.54  In addition, assumptions that convictions connote crime 
commission—and that a lack of convictions bespeaks innocence—are neither 
race-neutral nor class-neutral.55  Convictions are disproportionately imposed 
on poor people and people of color.56  Thus, assumptions that convictions 
correspond to factual guilt risk compounding the stereotyping of people of 
color and poor people as lawbreakers,57 including assumptions of their 
dangerousness.58  Meanwhile, whites benefit disproportionately from the 
flip-side assumption, thus becoming the beneficiaries of still more “White 
credit.”59  Finally, if those who are assumed to have committed crimes lose 
some portion of the empathy that they might otherwise inspire,60 assumptions 
that convictions connote crime commission risk lessening concern in a 
number of important reform areas, such as jail and prison conditions, 
sentencing, and other consequences of conviction. 
So, this Article suggests that even as important claims are made about the 
need for reform initiatives, such as nonpunitive approaches, care should be 
taken to combine them with reminders that, in some unknown but potentially 
large number of cases, there is nothing to punish.  Such efforts not to erase 
the system’s fallibility can take the form of explicit caveats; they can also 
 
 53. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, DNA Exonerations and the Elusive Promise of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 271, 277 (2017) (“[O]ur criminal justice system exists 
in order to sort the guilty from the innocent.”). 
 54. See George C. Thomas III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 543, 546 (“How many times is an innocent defendant convicted?  No one knows because 
we have no independent method for determining who is innocent other than the very small 
number of almost random successful DNA claims made after a conviction has become final.”). 
 55. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1365 (“[N]ot only do bulk arrest practices discriminate 
against minorities, they potentially fill the system with innocent people of color who are then 
wrongly labeled ‘criminal.’ . . .  [This] dynamic is an important ingredient in the racialization 
of crime.”). 
 56. See Janet Moore et al., Privileging Public Defense Research, 69 MERCER L. REV. 771, 
773 (2018). 
 57. See Kenneth L. Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. 
& LITERATURE 1, 18 (2000) (stating that the most typical middle-class assumptions about race 
and ethnicity “associate poverty with a black or brown face, with crime, with immorality . . . 
and with a preference for handouts over work”); Justin Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit 
Racial Bias:  The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 
(2010) (explaining that mock jurors held “strong associations between Black and Guilty, 
relative to White and Guilty, and [that] these implicit associations predicted the way mock 
jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”). 
 58. See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 
509–10 (2012). 
 59. Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-characterization of the Negro”:  A Race Critique of 
the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 527 (2009) (“When Blacks are 
unfairly ‘taxed’ in the criminal system with perceived criminality, Whites receive an 
undeserved ‘credit’ with a perceived innocence or worthiness of redemption.”). 
 60. Radley Balko, Opinion, The Case for Releasing Violent Offenders, WASH. POST (Aug. 
14, 2017, 11:23 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/08/14/the-
case-for-releasing-violent-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/DQX2-665U] (“We want to punish 
criminals.  We want them to suffer.  We create hostile prison environments rife with violence, 
racial resentment and rape.”). 
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take the form of increased care with terms such as “felon,” “criminal,” and 
“offender” that, along with their other downsides, risk merging legal guilt 
with factual guilt.  Finally, they can involve efforts to ensure that neither 
definitions of words like “innocence” and “wrongful conviction”61 nor 
attempts to quantify those phenomena contribute to an overly narrow view 
of innocence.  To point out the problem of assuming the guilt of those who 
may not be guilty is not to endorse any of the extant consequences for those 
who are both legally and factually guilty.  But recognizing both the flawed 
nature of the system and our tendencies to make it seem otherwise is an 
important part of figuring out how to respond to the flaws. 
Part I will address the predominance of the plea and the subordination of 
the defense.  It will explain their potential—alongside a host of other 
factors—to leave us uncertain but concerned about the prevalence of 
convictions imposed in the absence of factual guilt.  Part II will describe a 
variety of ways in which legal scholarship often tends, either explicitly or 
implicitly, toward a portrayal of convictions as things that generally connote 
crime commission.  Part III will explore potential causes of this apparent 
fusion of legal and factual guilt.  Part IV will explore implications of fusing 
legal and factual guilt, explaining first why this fusion matters and, second, 
what might be done to address the situation. 
I.  FACTORS JEOPARDIZING THE RELIABILITY OF CONVICTIONS 
This Part will examine two factors whose analysis within legal scholarship 
reveals their potential to contribute to the phenomenon of convictions 
detached from factual guilt.  These factors—the predominance of the plea 
and the subordination of the defense—are chosen in part because of their 
widespread applicability and in part to counteract the tendency to think of 
innocence narrowly, as involving only “wrong man” scenarios,62 and thus 
perhaps to think that innocence concerns cluster solely around those factors 
identified by the Innocence Project as the leading contributors to “wrongful 
convictions”:  things like eyewitness misidentification, improper forensics, 
and so on.63  For all that the recognition of “innocence” among those with 
convictions has been an important contributor to reform,64 the way in which 
it is sometimes framed runs the risk of suggesting that those who are factually 
 
 61. See, e.g., Lillquist, supra note 12, at 184 (“When most of us think about wrongful 
convictions, we are primarily concerned with cases involving incorrect identifications.  These 
are cases where the claim is ‘I did not do the crime’ rather than ‘no crime was committed.’  
But even in cases in which we are certain that we have the right person, there can still be good 
reason to believe that the system was wrong about the defendant’s culpability for the acts the 
defendant committed.”). 
 62. Samuel Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 190 (2008) 
(“Inevitably, our image of false convictions is formed by the cases we know . . . .”). 
 63. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction./ [https://perma.cc/NF7E-
TM7A] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 64. Simon, supra note 24, at 145. 
2020] CONVICTIONS AS GUILT 2511 
innocent but convicted are a group of relatively small size affected by a 
discrete set of factors.  This Article hopes to unsettle that notion. 
A.  The Predominance of Plea Bargaining 
There is a reason that up to 97 percent of convictions are the product of 
guilty pleas.65  Indeed, there are many reasons.  Plea offers are designed to 
be so appealing that you would throw a bunch of constitutional rights out the 
window66 and admit that you committed a crime, even while knowing that 
punishment will follow.  Their appeal is not limited in its effect to “the 
guilty.”67  As this section will explain, trial is always a gamble; several 
factors mar the chances even of “the innocent”; the risks attending loss at 
trial are significant; and what a plea bargain offers is a relatively certain 
sentencing outcome and one that potentially avoids some of the worst aspects 
of loss at trial (and indeed, some of the worst aspects of pretrial hardship).  
Nor is it the case that existing safeguards prevent guilty pleas from being 
entered in the absence of guilt. 
1.  Chances at Trial 
If those who are factually innocent felt that their chances of being found 
not guilty at trial were sufficiently good, this would of course reduce the 
desirability of guilty pleas.  But the risks of trial are plentiful, even for those 
who are factually innocent. 
Aspects of the jury process contribute to the risk of convictions in the 
absence of factual guilt.  Subordinated groups are vulnerable to exclusion 
from criminal juries just as they are vulnerable to criminal charges.68  A 
dynamic where those from an “in-group” sit in judgment of an “out-group” 
member fosters bias,69 and bias can influence determinations of guilt.70  That 
white jurors are viewed by at least some accused people as embodiments of 
bias as opposed to neutral fact finders is illustrated by the use of the white 
jury as a tool to persuade suspects to confess.71 
 
 65. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness, supra note 3, at 1545. 
 67. See Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court:  An Examination of 
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 476 (1980) (stating 
that “plea bargaining may actually function perversely, placing the greatest pressure on 
defendants who are factually innocent”); id. at 477 (noting that “the rational choice may well 
be to enter a guilty plea despite factual innocence”); id. at 497 (mentioning “the fact that plea 
bargaining systematically undercuts the factual reliability of criminal judgments”). 
 68. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-trial World, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 2173, 2189–90 (2014) (mentioning exclusion from juries of people of color, people 
with felony convictions, poor people, and homeless people). 
 69. Roberts, supra note 2, at 866–67. 
 70. Levinson et al., supra note 57, at 207. 
 71. See Andrew Cohen, Confessing While Black:  When the Threat of a White Jury Is an 
Interrogation Tool, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 12, 2014, 8:37 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/12/confessing-while-black [https://perma.cc/ 
T77N-ELSZ]. 
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Nor can jury instructions cure the most troubling tendencies of jurors.  
Jurors may fail to understand instructions,72 they may be unable to comply 
with them,73 and they may consciously override them.74  The presumption 
that juries follow instructions is, as Alex Kozinski puts it, “more of a 
guess.”75  This goes for even the most fundamental instruction—the one that 
telegraphs how much is being done to ward off wrongful convictions—
namely the instruction not to convict where any reasonable doubt exists.76  
Similarly, the instruction that jurors should presume innocence until all the 
evidence is heard fails to serve its purpose.77  Jurors have of course convicted 
many people who were later deemed “innocent” in the narrow, wrong-man 
sense,78 and if one expands one’s view of innocence to encompass those who, 
for example, lacked the mens rea required by the crime or were not guilty 
because some other defense applied, one finds additional indications of 
juries’ vulnerability.  Jody Armour has identified mens rea deliberations as a 
hotbed of juror bias.79  With regard to defenses, as will be explained,80 they 
play an undervalued role in cultural understandings of what crime is.  There 
is reason to be concerned that they may also be undervalued by laypersons 
plucked off the streets to serve as jurors. 
Maybe one would worry less about the fact finders in one’s case if one had 
a broader sense of trust in the ability of the legal system to demonstrate the 
kind of qualities that seem necessary for a fair and accurate trial:  things like 
an interest in protecting the individual from unfairness; an awareness of what 
is at stake for the individual; openness to the fact that the individual might be 
innocent (and indeed is presumed innocent); effective and well-informed 
advocacy from the individual’s representative; an interest in accuracy; and a 
willingness to listen to what the individual has to say.  But up until the point 
 
 72. Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials:  The Limited Effectiveness of Legal 
Mechanisms, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 167, 174–75 (explaining that 
comprehension rates range from 13 to 73 percent). 
 73. See, e.g., Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the 
Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record:  A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 738 
(“[I]t cannot be assumed that jurors will follow an instruction on the use of evidence of 
previous convictions.”). 
 74. See Lillquist, supra note 12, at 184–85 (mentioning, in connection with the risk of 
wrongful conviction, a concern that jury instructions are unhelpful and sometimes worsen the 
situation). 
 75. Alex Kozinski, Preface, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at iii, 
viii (2015). 
 76. See Vida B. Johnson, Presumed Fair?:  Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of Our 
Criminal Justice System, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 545, 557 (2015). 
 77. See id. 
 78. For examples, see NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/VR7Z-SKLE] (last visited Apr. 12, 
2020) (currently detailing 2572 exonerations). 
 79. See Jody Armour, Where Bias Lives in the Criminal Law and Its Processes:  How 
Judges and Jurors Socially Construct Black Criminals, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 217 (2018) 
(“Only through radically overhauling the prevailing mens rea paradigm can we shed light on 
the enormous number of opportunities that exist in criminal trials for jurors’ racially biased 
moral judgments to result in the biased social construction of black criminals.”). 
 80. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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at which a defendant must decide whether she will take a chance on the 
possibility of a fair and accurate adjudication, if, like a disproportionate 
number of those who are prosecuted in this country, she is poor and a person 
of color,81 it is unlikely that she has experienced any of those things from the 
government authorities,82 including the law enforcement authorities,83 with 
whom she has interacted.  For example, the lives of those who are poor 
(including, and perhaps particularly, those who have been directly impacted 
by the criminal system) are not imbued with signals that the government 
cares vis-à-vis them about respect,84 accuracy,85 their stories,86 their 
protection,87 their presumptive innocence,88 or the stakes for them of 
governmental action.89  If their stance by the time of their plea decision is 
 
 81. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Shelley C. Chapman, I’m a Judge and I Think Criminal Court Is Horrifying, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2016/08/11/i-m-a-judge-and-i-think-criminal-court-is-horrifying [https://perma.cc/4DKT-
4UFS] (“I was shocked at the casual racism emanating from the bench.  The judge explained 
a ‘stay away’ order to a Hispanic defendant by saying that if the complainant calls and invites 
you over for ‘rice and beans,’ you cannot go.  She lectured some defendants that most young 
men ‘with names like yours’ have lengthy criminal records by the time they reach a certain 
age.”). 
 83. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 
YALE L.J. 2054, 2125 (2017) (suggesting that “incentives to arrest might . . . bring more people 
into contact with aggressive policing” and that “[e]ven if those people are never arrested, and 
even if they do not become suspects of any particular crime, this contact might have negative 
effects on their perceptions of police, reminding them of their relative worthlessness in the 
eyes of the state”). 
 84. See M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301, 339 (2018); Sarah Lustbader 
& Vaidya Gullapalli, The Waiting Game:  NYPD Ripped 1-Year-Old from Mother, but Why 
Did the Benefits Office Expect Her to Wait for Hours, Standing Up, with a Child?, APPEAL 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-waiting-game-nypd-ripped-1-year-old-from-
mother-but-why-did-the-benefits-office-expect-her-to-wait-for-hours-standing-up-with-a-
child/ [https://perma.cc/E7VC-Q9XU] (“In courtrooms, jails, and benefits offices around the 
country, low-income people are told to wait.  For hours.  They are not told to return in an hour, 
or that someone will call them when it’s their turn, or to take a seat, have a cup of water, and 
read a book.  In criminal court, defendants and their families are often forced to wait for hours.  
They must do so silently, and are not allowed to read a newspaper, let alone check their phone.  
There is simply no regard for their time.”). 
 85. See MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:  HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 10 (1979) (“There was little independent investigation of facts.”). 
 86. See Hanan, supra note 84, at 339 (mentioning “‘a court culture of indifference, 
disrespect, and hostility’ toward criminal defendants” (quoting Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, 
CROOK COUNTY:  RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA'S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 55 
(2016))); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless:  The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1449, 1456–57 (2005). 
 87. See Cecelia Trenticosta & William C. Collins, Death and Dixie:  How the Courthouse 
Confederate Flag Influences Capital Cases in Louisiana, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC 
JUST. 125, 138 (2011). 
 88. See FEELEY, supra note 85, at 9 (mentioning “court-oriented criminal justice with 
its . . . assumption that riffraff are probably guilty”). 
 89. See id. at 3 (“[Lower criminal courts] are chaotic and confusing; officials 
communicate in a verbal shorthand wholly unintelligible to accused and accuser alike, and 
they seem to make arbitrary decisions, sending one person to jail and freeing the next.”). 
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one of legal estrangement,90 it would not be a surprise.  It would also be 
unsurprising if, instead of leaving their fate in the hands of a combination of 
some or all of judge, prosecutor, government-funded attorney, and jurors, 
they chose to act as their own condemner. 
Then there is the fact that the government is not just the overseer of the 
process but also the adversary.  As discussed in the next section, defendants’ 
resources are usually significantly inferior to those of the government,91 in 
areas that include legal representation,92 investigation,93 and the ability to 
locate and compel witnesses.94  While defendants do have access to 
something that the government does not—their ability to testify—they are all 
too easily damned if they do and damned if they don’t.95  Defendants who 
testify at trial are vulnerable to attacks of all sorts:  they may lack the 
education, testimonial training, and jury appeal that the government’s 
witnesses have,96 and they may be vulnerable to scathing cross-
 
 90. See Bell, supra note 83, at 2125; Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, New Sheriff; Old 
Problems:  Advancing Access to Justice Under the Trump Administration, 127 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 254, 262 (2017) (“The demographics of those who mistrust government, 
unsurprisingly, correspond to those most affected by the justice gap—those living in poverty, 
people of color, women, immigrants, the elderly, people with disabilities, and LGBT 
individuals.”). 
 91. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1997). 
 92. See George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Claims of Innocence?:  
Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 273 (2003) (“If many 
innocent suspects do not meet their lawyer until he arrives with a plea bargain in hand, . . . 
some might be tempted to take the offer.  After all, if you are innocent, it would not inspire 
much confidence in your lawyer if you meet him for the first time only when he has already 
assumed your guilt and bargained a jail sentence for you.”). 
 93. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1360, 1375–76 (“Defense counsel has far fewer 
resources and less access to incriminating witnesses than the prosecution.  When representing 
an indigent, defense counsel needs the permission of the court to expend any monies on 
investigators or experts.  While the defendant has a right to subpoena witnesses, enforcing 
those subpoenas frequently requires the active participation of the police or court officers.  
Thus, defense counsel must depend frequently upon the goodwill of the state or the judge.”); 
Simon, supra note 72, at 172 (“The vast majority of criminal defendants lack the resources, 
expertise, and legal authority to investigate crimes effectively.”); David Alan Sklansky, 
Autonomy and Agency in American Criminal Process 18 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper 
No. 2849226, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2849226 
[https://perma.cc/DPQ3-GN6E] (“In a criminal case, though, the parties have vastly different 
investigatory resources.  The prosecution has the police; the defense does not . . . .  Lawyers 
representing indigent defendants, in particular, often lack the means to conduct any kind of 
independent investigation.”). 
 94. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1375–76. 
 95. See, e.g., Alan Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place:  The Right to Testify and 
Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1997) (“When [a hypothetical 
person who is poor, African-American and from the inner city] is arrested and charged the 
third time, he is more likely to face imprisonment.  At that point, [he] may wish to plead ‘not 
guilty’ and go to trial.  If he does so, he will have two choices:  (1) He may elect to testify and 
deny his guilt, in which case his prior convictions may be used to impeach and he will likely 
be convicted; or (2) He may elect to forego his right to testify in order to prevent his prior 
convictions from coming before the jury, in which case he is likely to be convicted.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 96. See Simon, supra note 72, at 171 (mentioning “the credibility advantage that police 
officers enjoy over criminal defendants”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 
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examination97 on subjects such as criminal records.98  Whereas impeachment 
of a defendant with her prior convictions is supposed to be done only for the 
purpose of attacking her truthfulness as a witness, such impeachment has the 
effect, and some would say the purpose, of encouraging propensity-based 
reasoning.99  If defendants instead take the path of remaining silent, they get 
punished by jurors who want to hear both sides of the story.100  One study of 
exonerees revealed that the most common reason for their waivers of the right 
to testify was their fear that their prior convictions would be used to crush 
them.  While this fear was well-founded,101 from their silence followed their 
conviction.102 
2.  Risks After Trial 
Paired with the risks that trial will end in a guilty verdict are the risks of 
what that might entail.103  Of course there is the sentence, frequently inflated 
beyond what was offered pretrial, thanks to the “trial penalty.”104  The desire 
to lessen sentencing exposure is a huge driver of guilty pleas105 and does not 
 
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1080 (2013) (mentioning that “most of the criminal justice 
population is poor, undereducated, suffering from substance abuse and/or mental health 
challenges, and thus in a poor position to understand their legal options or advocate for 
themselves”). 
 97. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE:  A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 89 (2009). 
 98. John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 489 (2008). 
 99. See id.; see also Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress:  How the Federal Courts 
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 289, 296 (2008) (“Scholarly commentary in the modern era has resolutely derided 
prior conviction impeachment as a mean-spirited penalty imposed on criminal defendants—
nothing more than a thinly veiled effort by prosecutors (condoned by ‘law and order’ courts 
and legislators) to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence of a defendant’s criminal 
propensities through the back door of credibility impeachment.”). 
 100. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1369. 
 101. See Blume, supra note 98, at 493 (stating that his data “confirm[ed] that threatening a 
defendant with the introduction of his or her prior record contributes to wrongful convictions 
either directly—in cases in where the defendant is impeached with the prior record and the 
jury draws the propensity inference—or indirectly—by keeping the defendant off the stand.”). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 
207, 226 (2013) (“For all but the simplest crimes, prosecutors can pile up charges to the point 
where the incentive to plea bargain becomes overwhelming.”). 
 104. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY:  THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 
(2018), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-
trial-penalty-the-sixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-
save-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5Q9-PPMX].  Note also the slimness of the protection against 
vindictive prosecution. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) 
(finding no constitutional violation where the rejection of a plea offer of five years in prison 
was followed by the invocation of a “recidivist” statute threatening a life sentence). 
 105. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 279 (saying of the innocent defendant who is at risk of 
a five-year prison term that “[i]f she estimates that she has an 80% chance of acquittal at trial, 
she should accept any plea bargain that offers her less than one year in prison”). 
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dissolve in the presence of innocence.106  The threat of mandatory minimum 
sentences, for example, may provoke guilty pleas even by those who are not 
factually guilty.107 
There are also myriad consequences other than the formal sentence that 
can contribute to the relative desirability of a guilty plea, even when someone 
is innocent.  The question of which “collateral consequences” will attach to 
a guilty plea is a powerful ingredient of plea bargaining,108 including 
consequences relating to one’s immigration status,109 ability to work,110 and 
presence on a state “offender” registry.111  Prosecutors have enormous 
leverage, thanks in part to a wide variety of qualitatively different 
experiences that they can offer:  a life sentence instead of death,112 a 
misdemeanor conviction instead of a felony conviction,113 no incarceration 
instead of incarceration,114 a disposition that will not get you deported,115 
one that will get you drug treatment,116 one that will spare a loved one from 
prosecution,117 or one that will not require you to register as a “sex offender” 
for the rest of your life.118  Buried among the array of prosecutorial tools is 
likely to be one that can make you buckle.119 
3.  Risks Before Trial 
For many people (guilty or not), it is the risks posed pre-adjudication, such 
as pretrial detention, that provide the most immediate incentive to accept a 
 
 106. See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice:  Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and 
the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 84–86 (asserting that “it is clear that plea-
bargaining has an innocence problem” and surveying estimates). 
 107. See Paul Butler, Poor People Lose:  Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 
2176, 2184 (2013) (“Prosecutors, using the legal apparatus of expansive criminal liability, 
recidivist statutes, and mandatory minimums, coerce guilty pleas by threatening defendants 
with vastly disproportionate punishment if they go to trial.”). 
 108. See Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901, 905–14 
(2017). 
 109. See Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 
960–61 (2018). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss:  Collateral Consequences, Silence, 
and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2009). 
 112. See Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 
48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221, 234 (2012). 
 113. Ristroph, supra note 41, at 597. 
 114. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1346. 
 115. See Jain, supra note 109, at 960–61. 
 116. See John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth:  Limited Importance, 
Limited Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 218 (2015). 
 117. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 143, 157 (2011) (describing “wired” pleas). 
 118. See Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 856 (2019) (“There are many 
reasons the defense attorney wants to avoid registration, but the most important one is that 
being on the sex offender registry will exclude the defendant from shelters, group homes, and 
public housing.”). 
 119. Daniel Richman, Framing the Prosecution, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 679 (2014). 
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plea.120  Indeed, Jocelyn Simonson has suggested that it is the setting of bail 
that serves as our most important adjudicative moment.121  A guilty plea can 
often shorten the duration of one’s confinement122 and thus can offer the 
prospect of not just liberty but all that liberty can permit:  life with loved 
ones123 and other potential ingredients of a sustainable life.124  Pleading 
guilty can also lead to the possibility of what John Blume calls “a less 
restrictive custodial environment”125 by getting you out of the local jails, 
where conditions may be horrendous.126  In addition, pretrial confinement 
limits or destroys one’s ability to aid in the preparation of one’s defense127—
particularly if one’s lawyer never visits128—thus making any nonplea option 
seem still less viable.129 
Nor are the pressures to end a case—guilt or no guilt—confined to those 
in custody.  Court appearances are generally scheduled in disregard for—and 
perhaps in an eagerness to disregard130—a defendant’s other 
commitments.131  Assigned with hundreds of others to a courtroom docket, 
one may have to wait all day, only to be instructed to return on another day132 
 
 120. See Gross, supra note 10, at 776 (saying of a group of exonerees who pled guilty, that 
most appear to have done so “to get out of jail”); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html 
[https://perma.cc/6AJK-9UGP] (citing data in support of the conclusion that “bail makes poor 
people who would otherwise win their cases plead guilty”). 
 121. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 585 (2017) (“[F]or 
indigent defendants, [bail] often serves the function that a real trial might, producing guilty 
pleas and longer sentences when an individual cannot afford to pay their bail.”). 
 122. For a discussion of the paltry nature of speedy trial protections, see Roberts, supra 
note 4. 
 123. See Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial:  Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-
justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/YD6Q-EZV2] (“As a mother myself, I do not think 
there’s anything I wouldn’t plead guilty to if a prosecutor told me that accepting a plea was 
the only way to get home to my children.”). 
 124. See Natapoff, supra note 96, at 1051 (“Innocent defendants may plead guilty because 
they cannot afford bail pending trial and will lose jobs, homes, or children by remaining 
incarcerated, or they may plead because the trial penalty is too great relative to the plea 
offer.”). 
 125. See Blume, supra note 98, at 496 n.70 (“There are many reasons to question whether 
many defendants are in fact guilty of the underlying offense [to which they plead guilty].  For 
example, due to jail overcrowding and large criminal dockets in major metropolitan areas, 
many defendants plead guilty in order to obtain their immediate release or to get to a less 
restrictive custodial environment rather than spending a substantial amount of time in a local 
jail awaiting a trial date.”). 
 126. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
837, 877 (2018) (“As a general matter, conditions in jails are much worse than prisons 
nationwide . . . .”). 
 127. See Verified Petition for Class Certification & Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2–
4, Allen v. Edwards, No. 655079 (La. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Verified Petition]. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See FEELEY, supra note 85, at 276–77. 
 131. Id. at 272–75. 
 132. See Jain, supra note 109, at 959–60 (“Misdemeanor courts are too often plagued by 
delays, meaning that defendants who want their day in court face repeated postponements.  
The upshot of all this is that many defendants choose to waive their right to counsel and plead 
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and once again put in jeopardy one’s ability to be a parent, caregiver, worker, 
student, or patient.133  Unless, that is, one decides to end the case via plea.134 
4.  Lack of Safeguards 
One could perhaps counteract these pressures if one set up meaningful 
safeguards against the entering of guilty pleas in the absence of factual guilt.  
But such safeguards are lacking, a fact that is unsurprising given the 
incentives on the part of all the repeat players—courts, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys—to resolve a large number of cases via plea.135 
Naturally, defendants are themselves potential safeguards:  they can refuse 
to plead guilty if it is unacceptable to them to admit guilt.136  One should 
remember, however, that the criminal law is a complex, inaccessible thing.  
There is a colloquial sense of what crimes are137—murders are killing people, 
for example138—and then there are the nuances, where you can kill without 
committing a murder,139 and even without committing a crime,140 depending 
on things that help define what is and is not a crime, such as mens rea and 
affirmative defenses.141  If we acknowledge that crime commission is a 
complex thing resting on the resolution of a variety of legal, factual, and 
normative questions, it is easier to see that defendants may not know whether 
they have committed a crime,142 particularly if they lack well-resourced 
counsel to investigate and advise.  They may know they were there; they may 
know they did something; they may know that in the colloquial sense that’s 
 
guilty as quickly as possible.”); David Feige, Opinion, Waiting and Waiting . . . for Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/opinion/waiting-and-
waiting-for-justice.html [https://perma.cc/2MER-QEHJ]. 
 133. See Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
779, 833 (2018) (“[M]any people—including innocent people—accept plea offers even when 
out of jail, to avoid coming back to court (and thus losing work days and possibly their jobs).”). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 
ALB. L. REV. 919, 939 (2015/2016) (stating that the American legal system, which “makes it 
in the interest of defense attorneys as well as prosecutors and judges to convince defendants 
to plead guilty” is “nearly perfectly designed to convict the innocent”); Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 714 (1981). 
 136. See Symposium, Stealing Innocence:  Juvenile Legal Issues and the Innocence 
Project, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 577, 586 (2012). 
 137. See Simon, supra note 72, at 176. 
 138. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1017 (describing the phenomenon whereby homicides 
are routinely described as “murders” in accordance with a colloquial sense of what crime is). 
 139. This is the case, for example, with manslaughter. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The 
Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 351, 424 (2005). 
 140. This is the case, for example, with a killing carried out in self-defense. See Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 451 (2008). 
 141. Note that the constitutional requirement regarding pre-plea advice relating to the 
components of a crime is limited to elements rather than defenses. See Shapiro, supra note 15, 
at 37 (“[A] plea of guilty, to be invulnerable to direct or collateral constitutional attack, must 
be knowingly and voluntarily made.  This standard requires the defendant to be informed of 
the essential elements of the crime as well as of certain constitutional rights.”). 
 142. See Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1415, 1431 (2016) (reasons for pleading include “misunderstanding what is required by 
the elements of the offenses” and “misunderstanding what intent is required”). 
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on the way, or all the way, to crime.  But in the nuanced sense of whether, 
under the law, a crime occurred, that question—if even answerable143—
requires not just factual but also legal know-how, so defendants cannot 
always act as their own safeguards. 
This brings us to defense attorneys.  Of course, all across this country there 
are zealous attorneys who are made queasy by repeatedly entering guilty 
pleas, perhaps particularly when they detect innocence,144 and who fight their 
hardest to prevent guilty pleas being taken by those who are innocent.  But 
there are also defense attorneys who are inclined to assume guilt145 and who 
may, as a result, resist guilty pleas with something less than alacrity.146  Even 
absent attorneys’ assumptions of guilt, there are resource deficiencies that 
may mean that defense attorneys are unable to conduct a rigorous screening 
for guilt147 or that they confront the prospect that they would be outgunned 
at trial and therefore conclude that a guilty plea is the best option for their 
client148—even where they detect innocence.  And in thousands of guilty plea 
proceedings, there are no defense attorneys at all.149 
The prosecutorial duty to do justice includes a duty to avoid the conviction 
of the innocent.150  But prosecutors have only limited access to evidence 
 
 143. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 144. See M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 30, 2007), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2007/10/30/rousting-the-cops/ [https://perma.cc/DYC4-
CXHY] (“[W]ell over half of my cases are misdemeanors, and I have had a disgraceful number 
of innocent clients, many of whom plead guilty . . . .”). 
 145. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, at xiv (1982) (“Any criminal lawyer 
who tells you that most of his clients are not guilty is either bluffing or deliberately limiting 
his practice to a few innocent defendants.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:  
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1269  n.121 (1993) 
(“[T]here is evidence that public defenders and criminal defense lawyers themselves believe 
that the vast majority of their clients are guilty of some wrongdoing.”); David Grann, Trial by 
Fire:  Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), http:// 
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann [https://perma.cc/YYP2-
62AD] (quoting the attorney for Cameron Todd Willingham, who may have been wrongly 
executed for murdering his three children, as saying, “[e]veryone thinks defense lawyers must 
believe their clients are innocent, but that’s seldom true . . . .  Most of the time, they’re guilty 
as sin”). 
 146. Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project:  A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing 
Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 327 (2009). 
 147. See Myrna S. Raeder et al., Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the Innocent:  Recently 
Adopted ABA Policies, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2006, at 14, 19 (“Although prosecutors’ offices 
are themselves underfunded, the situation is still worse for defense counsel, and the resulting 
disparities make it particularly hard for them to uncover the sorts of unintentional errors, 
omissions, and biases that can result in mistaken convictions.”). 
 148. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1170–71 (2008). 
 149. See Hughes, supra note 11, at 1113–14 (explaining how pro se defendants are 
particularly dependent on courts to tell them “that by pleading guilty they risk overlooking a 
viable defense and/or the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether it is wise 
to plead guilty, [because] once the plea is final, it is exceedingly difficult to ‘undo’ the 
conviction through post-conviction litigation” and that, despite this, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that courts have no constitutional obligation to provide such information). 
 150. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
607, 634 (1999) (mentioning the objective of “avoiding punishment of those who are innocent 
of criminal wrongdoing”). 
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relating to mens rea or potential affirmative defenses.151  In addition, office 
incentives tend to reward convictions.152  Finally, tunnel vision may increase 
the extent to which prosecutors are inclined to assume guilt and to discount 
information that is in tension with that assumption.153 
Then there is the judge and the law that she interprets.  There, too, the 
protections against pleas being allowed in the absence of factual guilt can be 
thin, whether one focuses on the trial level or the appellate stages.154  At trial, 
the burden of proof that fact finders are instructed to apply is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which is a standard justified in terms of its potential to 
prevent the conviction of those who are innocent.155  But when it comes to 
evaluating the basis for a plea, the standard appears to be one at the other end 
of the criminal justice spectrum:  probable cause,156 a standard that has been 
described as requiring “less than a fifty-fifty chance of guilt”157 and, indeed, 
“little more than heightened suspicion.”158  While many states require a 
guilty plea to have a “factual basis,”159 legal scholars have exposed the 
thinness of this requirement.160 
 
 151. Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for 
False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126, 149 (2013) (pointing out that prosecutors 
“don’t always see all of the evidence” and may miss “refuting evidence”). 
 152. See id. at 148 (“[P]rosecutor performance is often measured by conviction rates.”). 
 153. Id. at 149. 
 154. See Samuel Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are 
Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230, 7230 (2014) (“Few [felony guilty 
pleas] are ever subject to any review whatsoever. . . .  [T]he appeals that do take place are 
usually perfunctory and unrelated to guilt or innocence.”). 
 155. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man 
than to let a guilty man go free.”). 
 156. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 43–44. 
 157. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1349 (“[A]n innocent person can be legally arrested, 
sail through the weak screening processes of the prosecutorial and public defender offices, go 
to jail, and succumb to the pressure to plead guilty, all based on no more than a probability 
(less than a fifty-fifty chance) of guilt.”). 
 158. See Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1412, 1413–14 (2003) (“The plea bargaining system effectively substitutes a concept of 
partial guilt for the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is marvelously 
designed to secure conviction of the innocent.”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion 
in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 680–81 (“Probable cause is little more than 
heightened suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to screen out individuals who are 
factually not guilty.”). 
 159. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(f) (4th ed. 2017). 
 160. See Bowers, supra note 148, at 1170–71 (“Courts have allowed defendants to plead 
guilty to daytime burglaries to satisfy lesser charges, even when the crimes indisputably 
occurred in dark of night.  Courts have upheld pleas to ‘hypothetical crimes’ that exist in no 
penal code and require impossible mens rea.” (footnote omitted)); Jacqueline E. Ross, The 
Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
717, 721 (2006); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations:  A 
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212–13 (2006) (noting that “[a]t present, the 
factual basis inquiry into the plea is often perfunctory”). 
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Many judges will accept a guilty plea only if an admission of guilt is made, 
but this can again be a charade rather than an effective screen.161  And indeed 
in most states, an Alford plea is permitted162—a guilty plea nestled inside 
which is the defendant’s assertion of innocence—thus perhaps laying bare 
the minimal extent to which, for a guilty plea, guilt needs to be clear.163  Nor 
is this necessarily wrong in the system that exists.  Professor Josh Bowers 
argues that it is precisely right.164  What incentivizes judges to accept pleas 
even in these wobbly circumstances may be not just the pragmatic desire to 
move things along, or a tendency to assume the guilt of defendants, but a 
recognition that accuracy may need to be sacrificed in order to prevent 
grossly excessive exposure to punishment or other consequences.165  Truth 
is a luxury that not everyone can afford.166 
Thus, the kinds of screens that one might hope would be in place to prevent 
guilty pleas in the absence of factual guilt—those applied by defendants, 
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges—are often minimal.167  And such 
screens tend to be still more minimal on appellate review,168 as this Article 
further explores in Part I.C.169  If we examine the National Registry of 
Exonerations,170 we find numerous examples of those who pled guilty,171 
and scholars such as Professor Samuel Gross have suggested that guilty pleas 
might mask the innocence of a huge other group of people.172  Nor should 
 
 161. See Garrett, supra note 142, at 1421 (“Judges may ask a defendant to provide an 
‘allocution’ before pleading guilty, but the admission of guilt need not be under oath or very 
detailed, and it may just involve an in-court agreement that the defendant committed acts 
satisfying the legal elements of the crime.”); see also id. at 1427 (“An admission to having 
satisfied the elements of the crime . . . does not reach the question of whether any defenses 
might defeat criminal liability.”); id. at 1421 (“[T]he defendant may say little or nothing at all 
of any substance . . . [and] some courts even tolerate plea bargains en masse . . . .”). 
 162. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal 
Procedure:  The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1372 
n.52 (2003) (forty-seven states and the District of Columbia). 
 163. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970). 
 164. See Bowers, supra note 148, at 1123–24. 
 165. See Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 344–46 (2017) 
(describing judicial dismissals motivated by these reasons). 
 166. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 279 (“Plea bargaining puts a price tag on sorting the 
innocent from the guilty, and it makes that price too high for most defendants.”). 
 167. So too with grand juries. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 597 (noting that “a slight 
majority of states do not require grand juries to review felony charges, and where grand jury 
proceedings persist, they have been structured to favor the prosecutor and rarely fail to deliver 
indictment”). 
 168. See Gross, supra note 10, at 777. 
 169. See infra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 133, at 783–84 (“There is general consensus that 
documented exonerations in serious felony cases are only the ‘tip of the [wrongful conviction] 
iceberg.’” (quoting Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 531 (2005))). 
 171. See Colin Miller, Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims After Guilty Pleas, 10 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 671, 673 (2020) (stating that “74 out of 166 (44.6%) DNA and non-DNA 
exonerees in 2016 were individuals who had been convicted after guilty pleas”). 
 172. See Samuel Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction:  
Why We Know so Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 
930–31 (2008) (“[I]t is entirely possible that most wrongful convictions—like 90 percent or 
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any of this be taken as suggesting that trial is a panacea.173  After all, in many 
instances it is a well-justified fear of the fallibilities of trial that helps to impel 
pleas—all the features of trials laid out above174—and indeed the bulk of 
cases contained within the exonerations registry involved convictions at 
trial.175 
B.  The Subordination of the Defense 
Defense representation is vitally important as a means of protecting 
defendants’ rights176 and warding off convictions.177  Defense attorneys have 
an array of means by which they can reduce the risk of conviction in the 
absence of factual guilt.178  They can, for example, communicate skillfully 
with their clients, obtaining information and dissuading guilty pleas, whether 
through expressing or displaying the reasons to hold firm.  They can also 
advocate for pre-adjudication release and other pretrial conditions that will 
permit a client both to withstand the pressures to plead guilty and to assist 
with trial preparation.179  In addition, they can locate and talk to witnesses 
with the help of investigators;180 obtain and deploy knowledge of the 
 
more of all criminal convictions—are based on negotiated guilty pleas to comparatively light 
charges, and that the innocent defendants in those cases received little or no time in custody.  
If so, it may well be that a major cause of these comparatively low-level miscarriages of justice 
is the prospect of prolonged pretrial detention of innocent defendants who are unable to post 
bail.”). 
 173. See Gerard Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2123 (1998) (pointing out the problems that exist for the “poor and ill-represented” 
at trial, including disparate resources and juror prejudice); Simon, supra note 24, at 222 
(“[T]he adjudicative process falls short of reliably distinguishing between guilty and innocent 
defendants.”). 
 174. See supra notes 67–101 and accompanying text. 
 175. Approximately 55 percent of the 2016 exonerations, for example. See NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016, at 7 (2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9QJ-VJZA]. 
 176. See James Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?:  
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 213 (2012) 
(“Effective counsel is a prerequisite to the assertion of nearly every other right in the criminal 
justice system.”); Natapoff, supra note 96, at 1056 (recognizing defense counsel as “the 
preeminent existing safeguard for defendant rights and accurate outcomes”); see also Gross, 
supra note 10, at 773–74 (stating that a quarter of the exonerations in the National Registry of 
Exonerations are coded as involving “Inadequate Legal Defense,” but regarding many 
additional exonerees, it is thought that they “would not have been wrongfully convicted if 
their lawyers had done good work defending them”). 
 177. See, e.g., James Liebman et al., Capital Attrition:  Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–
1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000) (finding ineffective defense lawyering to be the 
biggest contributing factor to the wrongful conviction of capital defendants over a twenty-
three-year period). 
 178. See Adele Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CONVICTED:  
PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 220, 227 (Saundra Westervelt & John Humphrey eds., 2001) 
(“It is the defense counsel’s responsibility to protect [the innocent] from the mistakes of 
others:  from witnesses’ misidentifications, police officers’ rush to judgment, and 
prosecution’s reluctance to reveal potentially exculpatory material.”). 
 179. See Janet Moore, Reviving Escobedo, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1015, 1016 (2019). 
 180. See Myron Beldock et al., Opinion, The Death of the “Hurricane” and the Criminal 
Justice System’s Failures, LAW.COM (Apr. 14, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/ 
nationallawjournal/almID/1202652582104/the-death-of-the-hurricane-and-the-criminal-
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intricacies of the criminal law and all that it offers to the defense; negotiate 
with the prosecutor, and argue to the judge, for dismissal;181 and argue to the 
jury for acquittal.  They can also make effective use of discovery,182 analyze 
the evidence, conduct skillful jury selection, prepare their lay and expert 
witnesses to testify persuasively, educate the jurors through the use of lay 
and expert witnesses, conduct a cross-examination that exposes inaccuracies 
in the government’s evidence,183 put together powerful direct examinations 
and demonstrative aids, and so on. 
But this all takes time, skill,184 money,185 experience, investigation, 
training,186 clout, zeal, incentives that allow that zeal to flourish, and the 
backing of the law as interpreted by the court.  Attorneys for many criminal 
defendants, including many who are indigent,187 lack some or all of these.188  
Aspects of this crisis include deficits in time,189 skill,190 money,191 
 
justice-systems-failures/ [https://perma.cc/742S-3Z8V] (listing remedies “to significantly cut 
down the number of wrongful convictions” and mentioning that “poor defendants need 
adequately funded and trained defense counsel who have full investigative and technical 
experts to support them”). 
 181. See Roberts, supra note 133, at 834. 
 182. See Richard Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 252 (“A good 
lawyer cannot guarantee that an innocent person will not be convicted, but an aggressive 
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 183. Note the common description of cross-examination as “the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). 
 184. See Sklansky, supra note 93, at 14 (“Defendants suffer all the time because of their 
attorneys’ incompetence; that is the natural if disconcerting result of allowing a procedural 
system to place great weight on lawyerly skill.”). 
 185. See Donald Dripps, Does Liberal Procedure Cause Punitive Substance?, 87 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 459, 466 n.24 (2014) (mentioning Stuntz’s recommendation that courts should 
promote accurate verdicts by, for example, encouraging funding for indigent defense). 
 186. See Beldock et al., supra note 180. 
 187. 80 to 85 percent of criminal defendants are indigent. See Lisa Pruitt & Beth Colgan, 
Justice Deserts:  Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 
219, 222 n.14 (2010). 
 188. See Natapoff, supra note 86, at 1454 n.17 (“Recent studies of indigent defense indicate 
that poor defendants often receive little or no meaningful representation.”).  Note that these 
concerns extend to other defense attorneys as well. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Jain, supra note 109, at 959 (“Overworked defense attorneys—in egregious cases, 
representing upwards of two thousand clients per year—provide no meaningful advice.”); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 
1045 (2013) (“[O]verworked public defenders typically advise clients to accept pleas based 
on aggregate criteria such as the ‘market price’ for that offense in that jurisdiction, rather than 
the individual evidence . . . .”); Stuntz, supra note 91, at 40 (“In a system in which . . . public 
defenders represent hundreds of felony defendants per year, defense lawyers’ most important 
job is triage:  deciding which (few) cases to contest somewhat, which (very few) cases to 
contest seriously, and which ones not to contest at all.”). 
 190. See David Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
ONLINE 25, 29 (2017). 
 191. See Natapoff, supra note 86, at 1454 n.17 (“[T]he overwhelming evidence indicates 
that state public defender offices and appointed counsel are overburdened and 
underresourced.”); Stuntz, supra note 91, at 11 (stating that the “pay scales” of defense counsel 
“seem to preclude more than nominal litigation in more than a tiny number of cases”). 
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experience,192 investigation,193 and training,194 as well as incentives that 
point toward placating the prosecutor,195 mollifying the judge,196 not taking 
time away from other clients,197 and seeking the quickest resolution 
possible,198 which is often a guilty plea.199  Caseloads can reach into the 
thousands,200 and the average standard of representation of those who are 
poor is low.201  Underfunding and overwork mean that, according to one 
national report, public defenders “cannot interview their clients properly, 
effectively seek their pretrial release, file appropriate motions, conduct 
necessary fact investigations, negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor, 
adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless other tasks that 
normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time and 
resources.”202  Legal and resource constraints also threaten defense 
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that sometimes includes judges punishing defense attorneys for investigating cases, filing 
motions, or asserting their clients’ rights”). 
 197. See George C. Thomas III, How Gideon v. Wainwright Became Goldilocks, 12 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 322 (2015). 
 198. See id. 
 199. Koppl & Sacks, supra note 151, at 150 (noting that all three systems of government-
funded defense representation lack “an incentive to provide the best defense possible” and 
involve “a strong incentive to plea bargain”). 
 200. ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE:  THE TERRIBLE TOLL 
OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 9 (2009), https:// 
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/9b7f8e10-a118-4c23-8e12-1abcc46404ae/ 
misdemeanor_20090401.pdf [https://perma.cc/X57L-4GM4] (“In Chicago, Atlanta and 
Miami, defenders carry more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases per year.”); Stuntz, supra note 
91, at 70 (“[C]ounsel must bear caseloads that require them to start with a strong presumption 
against any significant investment in any given case.”). 
 201. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 275. 
 202. NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING 
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009), http:// 
www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM3T-6PGV]; see also Tigran 
Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness:  Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in 
Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 335 (2013) (noting that the crisis is not limited to 
public defenders but rather that “lawyers who represent indigent defendants under contracts 
with the government, or who receive appointments directly from the court, too frequently 
engage in subpar performance on behalf of their clients”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570 n.242 (2001) (“Legislatures . . . fund 
appointed defense counsel at levels that require an enormous amount of selectivity—counsel 
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attorneys’ ability to gain access to discovery,203 including discovery of 
exculpatory material,204 and to expert witnesses,205 as well as their ability to 
select an impartial jury,206 confront witnesses in a meaningful way,207 and 
attempt certain defenses.208 
Legal rules and standards often fail to impose a meaningful check on any 
of this.  Ethical rules governing defense attorneys set a low bar,209 and 
failures to clear the bar often go unremedied.210  Regarding the U.S. 
Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court’s declaration of a right to counsel does 
not include a funding mandate211:  the process that has evolved for poor 
defendants as a result is, as Professor William Stuntz put it, “a scandal.”212  
And while the standard that the Supreme Court set out in Strickland v. 
Washington213 requires that defense counsel be effective, this standard has 
been described as meaningless.214  It is worse than meaningless if it serves to 
 
can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their dockets, and can investigate only a 
small fraction of the claims their clients might have . . . .  The consequence is to steer criminal 
litigation away from the facts, and toward more cheaply raised constitutional claims.  Those 
claims tend not to correlate with innocence; or if they do, the correlation may be perverse.”).  
David Sklansky points out that this kind of problem exists with privately retained attorneys 
too. See Sklansky, supra note 93, at 11 (“Attorneys can undermine their clients’ chances by 
investigating cursorily, by questioning witnesses ineffectively, and by arguing unpersuasively.  
The lawyers appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants damage their clients’ cases 
too often in all of these ways.  A distressing number of privately retained defense attorneys 
fail their clients in similar fashion.”). 
 203. See Beldock et al., supra note 180 (mentioning that “defense counsel must have access 
to both police investigators and witnesses pretrial” while listing remedies “to significantly cut 
down the number of wrongful convictions”). 
 204. See Kozinski, supra note 75, at xxvi (explaining that, of the “three ingredients” 
required “before we can be sure that the prosecution has met its Brady obligations under the 
law applicable in most jurisdictions,” the first is “a highly committed defense lawyer with 
significant resources at his disposal”). 
 205. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1376. 
 206. See, e.g., Verified Petition, supra note 127, at 2–4 (“Without access to the effective 
assistance of counsel, the poor stand alone against the full unchecked power of the State.  They 
are denied not only their right to a fair trial, but are powerless to exercise the other fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to speedy trial, to confront witnesses, 
to impartial juries; the rights against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination; 
and the right to be free from excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 207. See id. 
 208. See Richard Delgado, Rotten Social Background:  Should the Criminal Law Recognize 
a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 38 (1985) (“[I]nsanity has 
been called the ‘rich man’s defense.’”(quoting WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, HANDBOOK 
ON CRIMINAL LAW 272 (1972))). 
 209. See Raeder et al., supra note 147, at 18. 
 210. See id. at 19. 
 211. See William Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn:  Doctrinal and Practical 
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995) (“[T]he Court 
has effectively ensured that Gideon guarantees little more than the presence of a person with 
a law license alongside the accused during trial.”). 
 212. Stuntz, supra note 91, at 76 (“Making Gideon a formal right only, without any 
ancillary funding requirements, has produced a criminal process that is, for poor defendants, 
a scandal.”). 
 213. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 214. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 276 (“That our current ineffective assistance doctrine 
is incapable of capturing those lawyers whose representation includes a failure to perform 
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demean the Sixth Amendment.215  It is worse than meaningless if it feeds off 
its own awfulness:  to meet Strickland’s first prong, one must identify 
lawyering that is worse than average, and, as Professor David Sklansky puts 
it, “the average quality of indigent defense lawyering is scandalously 
low.”216  To meet its second prong, one must show a reasonable probability 
that, without the subpar representation, the result would have been different.  
But, the worse the defense attorney, the stronger the prosecutorial evidence 
that pours into the record and thus the harder it is to satisfy this prejudice 
test.217  Further, in many cases where convictions are imposed, there is no 
defense attorney,218 so the question of effectiveness becomes moot.  Risky 
though it may be to represent oneself,219 when the provision of public defense 
comes with a fee attached—as often happens220—there is more of an 
incentive to go it alone. 
This is but a brief review of some of the inadequacies of defense 
representation—inadequacies that can enable the conviction of the 
 
‘basic tasks’ shows how meaningless our current legal standards are.”); Raeder et al., supra 
note 147, at 16 (“Inadequate defense counsel played a significant role in the rising tide of 
wrongful convictions.  We say ‘inadequate’ because counsel can meet the constitutionally 
minimal requirement of effectiveness while still failing to provide the level of quality 
representation that a system concerned with a reasonable degree of error-avoidance should 
expect.”). 
 215. See Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1883 (1994) (stating that the Supreme 
Court’s “acceptance of the current quality of representation in capital cases as inevitable or 
even acceptable demeans the Sixth Amendment”). 
 216. Primus, supra note 193 (manuscript at 63) (“[D]octrine in this area should be willing 
to treat norms as normative, rather than solely as descriptive of the lowest common 
denominator of legal representation in a given jurisdiction.”); see also Sklansky, supra note 
93, at 20. 
 217. See Bright, supra note 215, at 1864 (“Nor are reviewing courts able to determine after 
the fact the difference made by other skills that are often missing in the defense of criminal 
cases—such as conducting a good voir dire examination of jurors, effective examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses, and presenting well-reasoned and persuasive closing 
arguments.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 109, at 959 (“Defendants are not entitled to counsel or jury 
trials in all low-level cases.”).  Note also that even where the federal Constitution does 
guarantee counsel, judges do not always respect those guarantees. See NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, RUSH TO JUDGMENT:  HOW SOUTH CAROLINA’S SUMMARY COURTS 
FAIL TO PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 6 (2017), https://www.nacdl.org/Document/ 
RushtoJudgmentSCSummaryCourtsDontProtectConstRight [https://perma.cc/E6NZ-AP36]. 
 219. Sklansky, supra note 93, at 11 (“Defendants generally make a hash of representing 
themselves, often spectacularly so.”). 
 220. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT:  A 
BARRIER TO REENTRY 12 (2010) (“In practice, defender fees often discourage individuals from 
exercising their constitutional right to an attorney—leading to wrongful convictions, over-
incarceration, and significant burdens on the operation of courts.”); J. D. King, Privatizing 
Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. 561, 571 (2019) (stating that by 2017, “at least forty-three 
states had adopted the practice” of “charging criminal defendants for court-appointed 
counsel”). 
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innocent221—that have been explored within legal scholarship.222  What is 
curious is that, as with the predominance of the plea, flaws that are 
acknowledged when the focus is upon them often seem to be obscured—to 
lie hidden in their silos223—when scholars discuss people with 
convictions.224  The next section will examine the kinds of contexts in which, 
once a conviction has been imposed, the scholarly assumption often seems 
to be that it can reliably be understood as connoting factual guilt.  But first, 
this Article addresses the question of whether the concerns raised above 
cannot be ironed out postconviction, so that one can at least safely assume 
that a final conviction connotes factual guilt. 
C.  Inadequacy of Postconviction Safeguards 
Both the predominance of the plea and the subordination of the defense 
mean that preconviction screening for innocence may be minimal or absent.  
But perhaps one could rely on a presumption that a conviction, once final, 
connotes factual guilt, if one felt that our appellate and postconviction 
mechanisms generally serve to correct any errors that may have occurred at 
the plea or trial stage.  Some indeed take that position.225  But legal scholars 
have pointed out many reasons why such mechanisms seem unable to serve 
that function. 
While it is true that a variety of potential stages of review exist—direct 
appeals in state courts226 and collateral postconviction proceedings in state 
and federal courts227—at each, the chance of a successful claim is generally 
 
 221. See Adele Bernhard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Innocence Revolution:  
A Standards-Based Approach, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 226, 
226 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) (“Studies of the DNA exoneration dataset show that poor 
defense lawyering is a major factor in the conviction of the innocent.”); Gabriel J. Chin, 
Unjustified:  The Practical Irrelevance of the Justification/Excuse Distinction, 43 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 79, 94 (2009) (finding that, given factors that include “overburdened” defense 
attorneys, “verdicts do not always reflect underlying truth”). 
 222. Note also that the Innocence Project website currently features six “causes” of 
wrongful convictions, one of which is “inadequate defense.” See The Causes, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/#causes [https://perma.cc/7R8J-SCQY] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 223. See Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads:  Turn to Accuracy, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 421, 444–45 (2014) (“[T]he criminal law debate has much to gain from taking a bird’s-
eye view of how the entire system operates as a whole . . . .”). 
 224. For the notion that none of this is a secret, see, for example, Sklansky, supra note 93, 
at 20, which notes that the resources devoted to representation for those who cannot afford to 
hire a lawyer are “scandalously inadequate,” and the problem is “well known and persistent.” 
See also id. at 11 (explaining that “the average quality of the legal representation provided to 
poor defendants is notoriously low”). 
 225. See Thomas et al., supra note 92, at 294 (“[S]cholars and jurists have long believed 
that situations of erroneous incarceration are relatively rare, especially once the rights to 
appeal and collateral review are taken into account.”). 
 226. Note, however, that “only death-sentenced inmates enjoy an appeal-as-of-right to the 
highest state court following conviction at trial.” Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, The Death 
Penalty and Mass Incarceration:  Convergences and Divergences, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 189, 
206 (2014). 
 227. Simon, supra note 72, at 201. 
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slim,228 even for “the innocent.”229  There is an absence of effective 
procedures for establishing that a conviction is false.230  At the appellate 
stage, arguments tend toward procedure rather than substance,231 and if a 
substantive argument is attempted, the appellant faces particularly high 
standards.232  At the habeas stage, relief is rare,233 thanks to a combination 
of statutes, such as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996234 (AEDPA), and aspects of the caselaw, such as the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to declare a right to a freestanding claim of innocence.235  Other 
obstacles include delays that deter litigation,236 governmental resistance to 
postconviction claims of innocence,237 daunting burdens of proof,238 lack of 
representation,239 and difficulty in obtaining the knowledge or evidence 
 
 228. Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1941, 
1980 (2019) (mentioning “a ratio of about eight appeals for every ten thousand misdemeanor 
convictions in state trial courts, or one in 1250” and pointing out that “only one conviction or 
sentence out of every ten thousand misdemeanor judgments [was] actually disturbed on 
appeal”); Justin Murray, Prejudice-Based Rights in Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 
277, 311 (2020) (“[J]ust a fraction of convicted defendants challenge their convictions or 
sentences on appeal, and an even smaller proportion pursue postconviction review.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 229. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-
conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 472 (2009) (noting that “the 
legal process holds out little hope for wrongfully convicted defendants, especially in the 
absence of help from prosecutors”); Thomas et al., supra note 92, at 289 (describing low rates 
of success at each stage). 
 230. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1321–22 (stating that “[t]he absence of effective 
procedures for establishing that a conviction is false means that few prisoners can verify their 
innocence” and that “[t]he paucity of such cases in turn reinforces the belief that innocent 
people are not convicted and justifies the criminal justice system’s failure to provide effective 
remedies”). 
 231. See Rosen, supra note 182, at 284 (stating that, on direct appeal, defendants “cannot 
present new evidence of innocence or argue that the jury got it wrong”); Stuntz, supra note 
91, at 42–43. 
 232. See Stuntz, supra note 91, at 61 (“[J]udicial review targeted at potential errors on the 
merits—at cases where the wrong person was convicted—has been surprisingly muted.”). 
 233. See Thomas et al., supra note 92, at 289. 
 234. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.); see Kozinski, supra note 75, at xlii (stating that AEDPA “effectively removes federal 
judges as safeguards against miscarriages of justice”); Allegra McLeod, Prison Abolition and 
Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1214–15 (2015) (“[U]nder AEDPA, even in cases 
with gutting evidence of possible innocence, courts have deferred to the state’s right to kill 
possibly innocent persons on the ground that finality of a conviction must take priority over 
other moral and constitutional considerations.”). 
 235. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (stating that “the threshold showing 
for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high”). 
 236. Murray, supra note 228, at 311 n.221. 
 237. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, The Path to Exoneration, 79 ALB. L. REV. 325, 
332 (2016). 
 238. See Murray, supra note 228, at 311–12 (“[E]ven when defendants who have well-
founded claims of prejudicial error do seek appellate or postconviction relief, there is a risk 
that courts reviewing those claims will reject them anyway due to deficient pleading or 
briefing (especially at the postconviction stage, where most defendants have to proceed pro 
se), incentives to preserve finality, the stringent burden of proof that defendants must satisfy 
under Bagley, Strickland, and related cases, and other reasons.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 239. Daniel Givelber notes that, in order to obtain collateral relief on the basis of a 
prosecutorial failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, “the defendant must discover the 
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necessary to make a viable claim.240  In addition, it is dangerous to claim 
innocence if one may need to show remorse.241 
Additional difficulties cluster around the two vulnerabilities on which this 
Article focuses:  pleas and counsel.  Pleading guilty leads to significant 
restrictions on the possibility of a subsequent claim of innocence.242  The 
guilty plea may involve waivers of most of the salient appellate issues243 and 
of the ability to appeal.244  And in regard to those who may have had 
inadequate defense representation, the courts hold defense attorneys to 
meager standards245 and litigation delays deter their invocation.246  In 
addition, rules relating to unpreserved errors247 and procedural default248 
further penalize those with subpar counsel.249 
 
existence of exculpatory evidence.”  Givelber, supra note 9, at 1389–90.  “As a practical 
matter, this requires [among other things] a lawyer prepared to engage in post-conviction 
litigation.” Id. at 1390; Simon, supra note 72, at 201 (“[T]he majority of inmates conduct their 
post-conviction affairs without the benefit of legal counsel.”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 
226, at 206 (“Although all state prisoners are nominally afforded the right to litigate 
constitutional claims in federal habeas corpus, only death-sentenced inmates are statutorily 
afforded counsel in cases of indigency.  The same is true in most states regarding 
representation in state post-conviction proceedings.”). 
 240. See Kozinski, supra note 75, at xv; Murray, supra note 228, at 311 n.221 (mentioning 
that “some defendants simply lack knowledge about the errors that might support a claim for 
relief—particularly when the type of error in question is the suppression of Brady evidence, 
which is by its nature hidden from view unless and until the concealed evidence is fortuitously 
discovered”). 
 241. Rosen, supra note 182, at 282–83. 
 242. See Miller, supra note 171, at 4 (“[A] number of states have interpreted their 
postconviction statutes to prohibit pleading defendants from (1) seeking DNA testing and/or 
(2) presenting freestanding claims of actual innocence based upon non-DNA evidence.”). 
 243. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 281 (“Prosecutors can condition a plea bargain on a 
defendant’s waiver of her right to DNA testing, and they can also require defendants to waive 
any rights to appeal or to otherwise challenge their convictions.  There are plenty of examples 
of innocent defendants who have pleaded guilty rather than wait for DNA testing because 
prosecutors refused to keep the plea bargain offer open until the tests came back and 
defendants knew the results might be inconclusive.”); Hughes, supra note 11, at 1111 (stating 
that “defendants who plead guilty forego most of their salient appellate issues in the process 
of pleading guilty”); Sklansky, supra note 93, at 12 (stating that “waivers of the right to appeal 
and the right to seek habeas review are common features of plea agreements”). 
 244. See Hessick, supra note 53, at 281. 
 245. See id. at 275 (“The courts have continued to apply exactingly high standards of 
review to ineffective assistance claims.  So even though judges now know for certain that an 
ineffective defense attorney can significantly increase the chances of an innocent person being 
convicted, those judges are still unlikely to grant a new trial to a defendant with a hopelessly 
bad lawyer.”). 
 246. See Primus, supra note 193 (manuscript at 24 n.117) (“Most defendants have no 
incentive (or even ability) to file post-conviction challenges to their trial attorneys’ 
performance, because it takes years to get to post-conviction review and the defendants are 
released from custody before post-conviction review becomes possible.”). 
 247. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(e). 
 248. See Sklansky, supra note 93, at 12 (explaining that attorney negligence can lead to the 
forfeiture of some of the rights to seek review of a conviction). 
 249. See Bright, supra note 215, at 1862 (“So long as counsel’s performance passes muster 
under Strickland, those cases in which the accused received the poorest legal representation 
will receive the least scrutiny on appeal and in postconviction review because of [the] failure 
of the lawyer to preserve issues.”); see also id. (“Failure of counsel to recognize and preserve 
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In reviewing the universe of factors, both pre- and postconviction, that 
jeopardize reliability, it might almost appear that the system is not that 
interested in accuracy.250  Indeed, some scholars have arrived at that 
conclusion.251 
From the broad applicability and severe nature of the weaknesses within 
plea bargaining, defense representation, and the postconviction opportunities 
to assess accuracy, this Article draws the conclusion that there is no reason 
for blanket assumptions that conviction connotes crime commission and 
every reason to assume that some unknown but potentially large proportion 
of convictions are imposed in the absence of factual guilt.  As will be 
discussed below, many scholars attempt to quantify, or at least estimate, the 
proportion of convictions that are imposed in the absence of factual guilt.252  
This Article urges attention to the limitations of such attempts, particularly 
in light of the concept of “innocence” presented in this Article, namely the 
situation where one did not commit the crime in question, with crime 
understood in its full definition, including elements such as mens rea and the 
absence of defenses.  This Article posits instead that one should admit 
ignorance as to the number of convictions imposed in the absence of factual 
guilt and not rush from ignorance to an assumption that the number must be 
very small.253  Yet even though factors contributing to the unreliability of 
convictions are widely discussed within legal scholarship,254 in a variety of 
contexts legal scholars talk about those with convictions in ways that appear 
to assume reliability.  The next Part will discuss this apparent barrier between 
understandings of the criminal system and views of those who pass through 
it. 
 
an issue, due to ignorance, neglect, or failure to discover and rely upon proper grounds or 
facts, even in the heat of trial, will bar federal review of that issue.”). 
 250. See Rebecca Shaeffer, Remarks at the ABA Eleventh Annual Criminal Justice Section 
Fall Institute (Nov. 2, 2018) (event attended by author) (discussing how, due to the societal 
interest in truth-finding and building a record, most countries, but not the United States, limit 
the kinds of cases eligible for plea bargaining). 
 251. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1336 (“[V]irtually everything known about the actual 
operation of the criminal justice system points to a level of indifference regarding the accuracy 
of fact determination which routinely condemns the innocent and frees the guilty.”); Simon, 
supra note 24, at 204 (“One of the most complicated and underappreciated features of the 
criminal justice process is the low value it assigns to the accuracy of its factual 
determinations—or, in legal parlance, the finding of truth.”); id. at 205–06 (giving numerous 
examples of how “[t]he relegation of factual accuracy manifests itself throughout the criminal 
justice process”); id. at 210 (“It is noteworthy that despite the pervasive relegation of the 
correct determination of facts, proponents of the criminal justice process swear by the 
accuracy of its outcomes.”). 
 252. See Cassell, supra note 25, at 817 (“[W]hile staking out a position of unknowability, 
many of the same scholars have been willing to venture specific estimates of a false conviction 
rate . . . .”). 
 253. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1330 (stating that for a “large and crucial subset of the 
[criminal court] docket,” the conclusion that convictions are valid “is more leap of faith than 
demonstrable fact”). 
 254. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 193 (manuscript at 1) (“Everyone knows that the 
conditions under which indigent defense services are provided often make effective 
representation impossible.”). 
2020] CONVICTIONS AS GUILT 2531 
II.  FUSION OF LEGAL AND FACTUAL GUILT 
Despite the vulnerabilities laid out in Part I—vulnerabilities that this 
Article argues should leave a question mark hanging over the reliability of 
criminal convictions as markers of factual guilt—legal scholarship often 
appears to take that factual guilt as a given.  This Part will give examples, 
first of explicit statements voicing confidence in the correspondence between 
legal and factual guilt and, second, of situations where the factual guilt of 
those with convictions appears to be assumed.  Since it is sometimes said that 
the factual guilt of those with convictions must be taken as a given by some 
of those who work within the criminal system,255 this Part will end by 
considering the distinct role of legal scholars. 
A.  Explicit Statements 
As this section will show, scholars often assert that those with convictions 
are for the most part factually guilty;256 indeed, scholars often assert that 
most defendants are guilty257 and that the core work of the defense bar is to 
represent the guilty.258  In addition, legal scholars sometimes try to pin down 
or cabin the proportion of convictions that are “wrongful” through invocation 
of statistics in a way that risks downplaying the extent of the problem. 
First, despite the fact that the standard of proof required for guilty pleas 
best approximates probable cause,259 it is not unusual for legal scholars to 
assert that convictions are necessarily the product of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.260  Some then move from a confidence in the procedures 
that have preceded convictions to an assertion that the reliability of the 
convictions is high.  Thus, Professor Victor Gold states that because 
convictions are the result of either guilty pleas or trials, the misconduct said 
 
 255. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 256. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 10, at 779 (“For the most part, inmates in American prisons 
are guilty.  The African Americans among them may have been victims of discrimination by 
the police or in court, but the overwhelming majority are imprisoned for crimes they did 
commit.”). 
 257. See Stuntz, supra note 91, at 34 (“The large majority of defendants presumably are 
guilty . . . .”). 
 258. See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 9, at 1396 (“It is, after all, a commonplace that the role 
of defense counsel is to defend the guilty, not the innocent.”). 
 259. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 43–44. 
 260. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE:  TEACHER’S MANUAL 183 (3d ed. 2013) (stating that 
“[b]y definition, crimes introduced under Rule 609 [the federal evidence rule permitting 
impeachment by prior conviction, whether the conviction was the product of trial or a guilty 
plea] have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Chin, supra note 221, at 90 (stating that 
“a valid conviction represents a finding that every element of a particular offense has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Findley, supra note 11, at 1196 (“[P]resumably every 
one of the prosecutors in the 270 plus DNA exonerations at one time believed, and convinced 
a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty . . . .”); Victor Gold, 
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence:  Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2310 (1994) (“Any doubts that the witness [being impeached with her 
conviction] committed the crime in question are negligible since a conviction rests on 
satisfaction of the most demanding burden of proof [i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt].”). 
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to have been committed by the defendant “is almost certain to have 
occurred.”261 
Many legal scholars are comfortable asserting that those who await 
adjudication of their charges—that is, those who are still defendants—are 
mostly guilty, thus indicating by implication that a still higher proportion of 
those who are convicted are guilty.262  It is also common to state that the role 
of the defense attorney is to represent the guilty.263  Of course, given the 
elusive nature of factual guilt,264 it is hard for scholars who assert the 
predominance of factual guilt to support those claims.  They either offer no 
support, point out that Alan Dershowitz said it,265 or provide figures 
representing legal guilt (that is, convictions),266 as opposed to factual guilt. 
 
 261. 28 VICTOR J. GOLD ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6118 (2d ed. 2019) 
(“Evidence admitted under Rule 609 relates to witness misconduct that is almost certain to 
have occurred since it was the subject of a criminal conviction.”); see also Victor Gold, Two 
Jurisdictions, Three Standards:  The Admissibility of Misconduct Evidence to Impeach, 36 
SW. U. L. REV. 769, 775 (2008) (claiming that there is “no serious question” about the 
witness’s guilt, “since a conviction must be based on either the witness’ guilty plea or on proof 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”); Edward Imwinkelried & Miguel Méndez, Resurrecting 
California’s Old Law on Character Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005, 1034 (1992) (“[I]n the case 
of convictions the evidence is reliable.  The accused either admitted committing the crime by 
a plea of guilty or has been found guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 262. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL:  LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 216 (4th ed. 2011) (“[M]ost defendants are guilty of some crime.”); H. 
RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD:  IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? 119 (1999) 
(“[N]early all defendants are in fact guilty . . . .”); Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the 
Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 182 (1983) (“[M]ost defendants are guilty of something 
along the lines of the accusation.”); Bowers, supra note 148, at 1162 (“[M]ost defendants are 
in fact guilty . . . .”); Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal 
Sentencing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 853, 865 (2005) (“[M]ost criminal defendants are guilty . . . .”); 
Robinson O. Everett, Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 1, 8 (“[M]any 
assume—probably correctly—that most criminal defendants are guilty of some crime.”); 
Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests:  How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 288 (2011) 
(offering as the first of two “basic truths about the criminal justice system” the fact that “most 
criminal defendants are guilty”); Jeffries, supra note 103, at 225 (“Most criminal defendants 
are guilty of something . . . .”); Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 
26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 99 (2015) (“[E]xperienced judges know that most defendants 
are guilty . . . .”); Michael O’Hear, What’s Good About Trials?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 209, 209–10 (2007) (referring to “the reality that most defendants are guilty”); 
Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921, 971 (1985) 
(“Most defendants are guilty and lack a credible defense . . . .”); Kenworthey Bilz, The Fall 
of the Confession Era, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367, 376 (2005) (reviewing LAWRENCE 
M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME:  THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(2005)) (“[M]ost criminal defendants are guilty.”). 
 263. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 265. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 145, at xxi (stating that the first of the “Rules of the Justice 
Game” is “[a]lmost all criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty” and that “[a]ll criminal defense 
lawyers, prosecutors and judges understand and believe” that to be true). 
 266. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 162 & 
n.36 (2013).  Schauer asserts that  
most criminal defendants are guilty of the crimes with which they have been 
charged, and that many of those who are not guilty of the crimes with which they 
are charged are guilty of other crimes, crimes often identical to or resembling or 
associated with the crimes with which they have been charged. 
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Finally, legal scholars sometimes cite statistics in an effort to quantify the 
problem of convictions being imposed in the absence of factual guilt.  Such 
attempts to cabin the phenomenon risk downplaying its extent, at least when 
the underlying research is cited without much context.267  The kinds of 
figures that get circulated as the proportion of people with convictions who 
are “wrongfully convicted” or “innocent” undercount in a variety of ways.  
When calculated on the basis of actual cases that came to light, for instance, 
they are likely to exclude those who lacked the representation,268 
incentive,269 written record,270 knowledge,271 or the correct procedural 
vehicle272 to get recognition that their conviction was wrongful.273  They are 
also generally restricted to certain kinds of “wrongful conviction”274 or 
“innocence,”275 such as “wrong-man” scenarios.276  Further, they are often 
limited to those—the vast minority of those who may be innocent—who are 
able to obtain an exoneration277 or the even smaller group able to obtain a 
DNA-based exoneration.278  Lastly, they may exclude, or largely exclude, 
 
Id.  He further claims:   
[t]his conclusion is an extrapolation from existing figures on guilty pleas (some of 
which will admittedly be by innocent defendants) and on conviction rates at trial 
(some of which will be erroneous) . . . but even the most conservative extrapolation 
is sufficient to support the point in the text. 
Id.  However, no support is given for that final redemptive assertion. 
 267. See Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 832 (“Virtually no one denies the existence of 
wrongful convictions, while the several studies on this question cap estimates at around 3% to 
5% of convictions.”). 
 268. See Roberts, supra note 133, at 780. 
 269. See Findley, supra note 11, at 1170 n.58. 
 270. See Gross & O’Brien, supra note 172, at 939. 
 271. See Roberts, supra note 133, at 812. 
 272. See id. at 813. 
 273. See Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 834 (stating that “‘lesser’ felonies, and certainly 
misdemeanors, may lack the record and interested advocates to investigate and pursue 
exonerations”). 
 274. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1327 (pointing out that commentators take a 
conservative approach to defining this term). 
 275. Id. 
 276. See D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted:  An Empirically Justified Factual 
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 n.2 (2007) (carving out 
of his influential estimates those who have “undoubtedly performed the actus reus of a crime 
for which they are not culpable, either because of insanity or the absence of some other 
required indicium of culpability, usually a particular required mental state”). 
 277. See Gross, supra note 10, at 785 (“[T]he number of false convictions is far higher than 
the number of exonerations.”); id. (noting that almost no misdemeanor exonerations occur); 
see also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 111 (2008) (“Innocence 
projects almost never take misdemeanor cases.”).  See Gross et al., supra note 154, at 7234, 
for a definition of “exoneration” as “an official determination that a convicted defendant is no 
longer legally culpable for the crime for which he was condemned.” 
 278. Note that the 5 percent “ceiling” often drawn from Risinger was limited to DNA-
exoneration cases, and that Risinger cautions against extrapolating from DNA cases since they 
are not a random sample of all cases of criminal conviction. Risinger, supra note 276, at 770.  
DNA exonerations “are almost entirely rapes and murders.” Findley, supra note 11, at 1167; 
see also Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 835 (stating that many exonerations have been based 
on DNA testing, yet “fewer than 20% of violent crimes involve biological evidence, and in 
the vast majority of past cases, biological evidence was not properly collected and held for 
future testing”); Robert Schehr et al., Contemporary Perspectives on Wrongful Conviction:  
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those who, even if able to obtain exoneration, obtained an exoneration whose 
existence was unknown to the researchers,279 and those who took pleas rather 
than going to trial.280 
These limitations often go unmentioned when the underlying studies are 
discussed.  In addition, figures drawn from studies that may have been 
limited to particular time periods,281 particular types of convictions,282 or 
small sample sizes,283 or that may be “wildly unrepresentative”284 or 
explicitly described by their authors as unsuitable for generalization,285 often 
get discussed without these sorts of qualifications,286 as if they can provide 
nationwide “wrongful conviction” figures.287  Further, even when 
 
An Introduction to the 2015 Innocence Network Conference, Orlando, Florida, 3 TEX. A&M 
L. REV. 179, 180 (2015) (“DNA exonerations are just a small percentage of wrongful 
convictions.”). 
 279. See Gross, supra note 10, at 784–85 (“No American jurisdiction has any system for 
recording exonerations; we have to go out and find the stories by whatever means we can 
devise.”); see also id. at 761 (“For many exonerations, avoiding attention may be a goal of all 
the professional participants in the case.”). 
 280. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 276, at 773 (presenting an analysis based on a study 
solely of trials); see also Findley, supra note 11, at 1167 (stating that it is quite likely that a 
huge proportion of false convictions are the product of pleas in cases other than rapes and 
murders). 
 281. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 276, at 762 (presenting an analysis based on a study of 
trials that occurred from 1982 through 1989). 
 282. Gould & Leo, supra note 20, at 836.  “[M]ost of what we know concerns errors in the 
most serious criminal cases—rapes and murders, and capital trials at that,” but it could be that 
“errors are more common, and more commonly accepted, in cases where neither police nor 
prosecutors have as much time, resources, or pressure to investigate cases thoroughly and in 
which the lesser stakes of punishment do not command as many or as zealous advocates to 
investigate cases postconviction.” Id.; see also Findley, supra note 11, at 1168 (“Offenders 
convicted of rape make up less than ten percent of state prisoners and offenders convicted of 
murder or non-negligent homicide compose only thirteen percent of state prisoners.”); Gould 
& Leo, supra note 20, at 862 (explaining that in the most serious cases “courts are most likely 
to step in and reverse a faulty conviction”); Samuel Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Letters to the 
Journal, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 273, 275 (2010) (“Ninety-five percent of known false 
convictions—exonerations—occur in cases of murder or rape, the two most serious common 
crimes of violence, which, between them, account for only about two percent of felony 
convictions.  That means that we know very little about false convictions for any other crimes 
of violence and virtually nothing about false convictions for non-violent felonies and 
misdemeanors.  (And even among rape cases, the false convictions we know about are 
concentrated among the minority of defendants who receive very long prison sentences.)”). 
 283. In regard to Risinger’s influential study, Professor Paul Cassell states, for example, 
that “[i]t is important to note that Risinger’s conclusions ultimately rest on a very small 
number of wrongful convictions—a total of only 11.” Cassell, supra note 25, at 828. 
 284. See Gross, supra note 10, at 785. 
 285. See Risinger, supra note 276, at 784–85 (stating that even though an average number 
might “salve our consciences,” one “cannot jump from a 3–5% factual wrongful conviction 
rate in capital rape-murders in the 1980s to a general factual wrongful conviction rate for 
crimes,” in part because there “probably would be [] contexts and kinds of crime in which the 
rate of factual innocence was higher, perhaps shockingly so”). 
 286. See, e.g., Tiffany R. Murphy, “But I Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For”:  
The Supreme Court’s Struggle Understanding Factual Investigations in Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1129, 1131 n.51 (2016) (“[R]esearchers suggest the rate of 
wrongful convictions in this country is 2–5 percent of the current prison population.”). 
 287. See Risinger, supra note 276, at 783 (arguing that one should “resist the temptation to 
expend much effort in pondering . . . a general average factual wrongful conviction rate”). 
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researchers come up with figures that they describe as floors, they sometimes 
appear in secondary literature as estimates of the figure288 or even of a 
ceiling.289  These figures, in other words, are sometimes presented as if this 
simply is innocence290 and simply is the scale of the innocence problem. 
Professor Samuel Gross cautions that “[p]atchy and unrepresentative data 
can mislead”291 and that “[o]n this topic they’ve led smart people to say that 
convictions of innocent defendants are vanishingly rare—which is 
demonstrably false.”292  And yet the estimates continue, most recently from 
Professor Paul Cassell,293 who presents the contestable nature of previous 
estimates not as a reason to hold back but as a justification for trying once 
again.294 
B.  Embedded Implications 
Ground into our core definitional text is an assumption that legal guilt 
connotes factual guilt.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “offender” as 
“[s]omeone who has committed a crime; esp., one who has been convicted 
of a crime.”295  Its portrayal of those convicted is of a Russian doll tucked 
inside another larger one, which comprises those who committed the crime.  
The use by legal scholars of “offender” to connote both those who have been 
convicted of a crime and those who (can be assumed to have) committed it 
is thus consistent with the dictionary definition296 but, this Article suggests, 
 
 288. Compare Gould & Leo, supra note 237, at 362 (stating that Risinger’s study puts the 
estimate for wrongful convictions in capital cases at 3.3 percent), with Risinger, supra note 
276, at 780 (presenting this figure as an “empirical minimum” with a “fairly generous likely 
maximum of 5%”). 
 289. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 239–40 (2015) 
(citing the study by Professor Samuel Gross in support of a 1 to 4 percent range).  Gross offered 
the 4.1 percent figure as a minimum. See Gross et al., supra note 154, at 7234.  
 290. See Schehr et al., supra note 278, at 180 (“[T]he few studies that have been conducted 
estimate that between 2.3% and 5% of all prisoners in the U.S. are innocent.”). 
 291. Gross, supra note 10, at 785. 
 292. Id. (adding that patchy and unrepresentative data has also led smart people “to believe 
that innocent people almost never plead guilty—but we have seen that they do, in large 
numbers”). 
 293. See Cassell, supra note 25, at 851 (focusing on “wrong person” cases and “violent 
crimes” and yet proffering an “estimated concrete, empirically grounded wrongful conviction 
rate range”). 
 294. See id. at 847 (“[L]ack of firm data has not prevented many other scholars from 
venturing an estimated wrongful conviction rate range.  The range presented here rests on at 
least as firm a foundation as many others that have been presented.”). 
 295. Offender, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 296. See, e.g., Francis Cullen et al., Reinventing Community Corrections, 46 CRIME & JUST. 
27, 33 (2017) (“People are in the correctional system because they are offenders.  For most, 
the current arrest and conviction represents only a fraction of the crimes they have 
committed.”); Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in 
Minnesota’s Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 263 (2009) (“[O]ffenders 
released from prison or jail confront family and neighborhood dysfunction, increased risks of 
unemployment, and other crime-producing disadvantages; this makes them likelier to commit 
new crimes, and the cycle repeats itself.”); Tekle-Johnson, supra note 33, at 613 (“Thrust out 
of mainstream urban society into a downward trajectory of ‘homelessness and transience,’ the 
convicted sex offender suffers from increased acute ‘psychosocial stressors,’ which is 
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is in tension with the factors laid out in Part I.  As will be described later,297 
what to do about “offenders”—and particularly various subsets of 
“offenders,” such as “drug offenders,” “sex offenders,” and “violent 
offenders”—is the subject of robust discussion in legal scholarship.298  Less 
prominent—perhaps absent thus far—is a discussion of what to do about the 
term and whether to reject the implicit fusion of legal and factual guilt that 
its definition endorses. 
“Recidivism,” used here to mean a return to criminal conduct,299 is another 
common topic of debate in legal scholarship that also seems to reveal a 
tendency to fuse legal and factual guilt.  Convictions are frequently used as 
a metric of both the first “criminal conduct” and the “return to criminal 
conduct.”300  One finds little or no questioning of the notion that criminal 
conviction is appropriate as an indicator of the first criminal conduct:  rather, 
the widespread emphasis on the importance of measuring the recidivism of 
those with convictions appears to take that as a given.301  As for the use of 
convictions to indicate a “return to criminal conduct,” when one sees 
concerns about that metric, they often involve its underinclusiveness.302  One 
rarely finds concerns about the ways in which, because of factors such as 
those mentioned in Part I, convictions can be an overinclusive marker of 
crime commission.303  Of course, in many instances, a conviction followed 
by a conviction may indeed represent criminal conduct followed by a return 
thereto.  But to hold the view that some, or many, or most situations of this 
kind involve recidivism is something different from resting on an assumption 
that that is always the case—or frequently enough that one does not need to 
mention a caveat. 
And then there are a wide variety of propositions made in support of 
criminal justice reform that, valuable though they may be, risk reinforcing 
 
alarmingly correlated with an increased tendency to reoffend.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
JILL S. LEVENSON, SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS:  A REPORT TO THE FLORIDA 
LEGISLATURE 15 (2005))); Marc Morjé Howard, Opinion, The Practical Case for Parole for 
Violent Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/opinion/ 
violent-offender-parole-sentencing-reform.html [https://perma.cc/HC2U-7WV6] (“This 
punitiveness makes us stand out as uniquely inhumane in comparison with other industrialized 
countries.  To remedy this, along with other changes, we must consider opening the exit 
doors—and not just for the ‘easy’ cases of nonviolent drug offenders.  Yes, I’m suggesting 
that we release some of the people who once committed serious, violent crimes. . . .  [E]ven 
for people convicted of violent crimes if they’ve demonstrated progress during their 
imprisonment. . . .  It bears no connection to solid research on how criminals usually ‘age out’ 
of crime . . . .  But are prisoners who have served long sentences for violent crimes genuinely 
capable of reforming and not reoffending?”). 
 297. See infra notes 308–10 and accompanying text. 
 298. See Levin, supra note 30, at 271–72. 
 299. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1000–07. 
 300. See id. 
 301. See, e.g., Klingele, supra note 39, at 769 (“The system’s success is frequently judged 
by the recidivism rates of those who are subject to various criminal justice interventions, from 
treatment programs to imprisonment.”). 
 302. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1003. 
 303. See id. 
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assumptions regarding the reliability of criminal convictions as markers of 
factual guilt.304  Some examples follow. 
Legal scholars have made or endorsed the following kinds of proposals:  
that all those with convictions should be given a second chance;305 that once 
they have paid their debt to society they should be afforded rehabilitation and 
redemption;306 that we should acknowledge that character is not static;307 and 
that people change.308  Similarly, scholars state that “sex offenders” should 
be spared permanent exile309 since their recidivism rates are not as 
“frightening and high” as sometimes feared,310 that “violent offenders”—and 
not just “nonviolent drug offenders”—should receive more “leniency,”311 
that “juvenile offenders” too should be eligible for lower sentences because 
the juvenile brain is different,312 and that “offenders” over a certain age 
should be eligible for release because people “age out” of crime.313  Scholars 
further argue that we overemphasize individual disposition as a cause of 
crime314 when in fact poverty is criminogenic.315  They also urge us to 
acknowledge that the misdemeanor system, rather than being a system of 
adjudication, acts as an assembly line.316  Finally, they point out that central 
to “what ails the petty offense process”317—and indeed the entire criminal 
process—is a problem of “overcriminalization.”318 
Each of these statements responds to an aspect of the criminal system, or 
a view of those who go through it, that is indeed problematic.  And yet, even 
 
 304. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 570 (“Much of the theory and discourse of criminal 
law, including the discourse of ‘reform,’ reproduces or simply takes for granted the ideological 
structures that make existing law seem moral and necessary.”). 
 305. See, e.g., Danielle R. Jones, When the Fallout of a Criminal Conviction Goes Too Far:  
Challenging Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 237, 240 (2015) (“Nearly ten 
years into this work, I still passionately believe that people deserve a second chance—a chance 
to redeem themselves, to heal wounds, and to secure work and put roots down in their 
community.”); see also id. at 237 (referring to those who have “paid their debt to society”). 
 306. See id.; supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 307. See Jon Schuppe, “I Refused to Be Bitter or Angry”:  Matthew Charles, Released from 
Prison and Sent Back Again, Begins Life as a Free Man, NBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019, 4:06 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/i-refuse-be-bitter-or-angry-matthew-charles-
released-prison-n955796 [https://perma.cc/QCV9-VMTE] (quoting Professor Shon Hopwood 
as saying that “I think what Matthew shows is that people can change, character’s not static 
and people can have redemption if given the opportunity to come out of federal prison and 
show they are a changed person”). 
 308. See id. 
 309. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 311. See Andrea Roth, Opinion, To End Mass Incarceration, Look Beyond “Non-violent 
Drug Offenders,” L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-
oe-roth-non-violent-prison-clemency-20150724-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y8EU-8VLV]. 
 312. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama:  What It Is, What It May Be, and What 
It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2013). 
 313. Howard, supra note 296. 
 314. See Binder & Notterman, supra note 32, at 42. 
 315. See Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1066. 
 316. See Natapoff, supra note 196, at 447. 
 317. Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1359 (discussing the incompleteness of the 
“overcriminalization viewpoint”). 
 318. Id. at 1359–60. 
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as they advance important goals, each of them risks appearing to take it as a 
given that those who are “offenders” in the sense of being legally guilty are 
also “offenders” in the sense of being factually guilty.319  After all, having a 
second chance at life seems to assume that one had a first chance and blew it 
by committing a crime.  “Aging out” of crime, or “recidivating” less than 
feared, seems to assume that one committed a crime to start with.  A plea for 
“lenient” sentencing suggests that conviction is appropriate, albeit with a 
more generous sentence than usual.  And an argument for redemption or 
rehabilitation seems to assume that one committed a crime and that, in doing 
so, one sinned or revealed that one is sick320 and thus needs fixing.321  If you 
say that central to our system of mass incarceration is a problem of 
overcriminalization, or that poverty is criminogenic, you risk suggesting that 
the way you get to prison (or to a conviction) is by committing a crime.322  
This notion of a direct connection between crime and punishment obscures 
many layers of influence on the way to punishment, in both the misdemeanor 
and felony systems.  These layers include not only the role of law 
enforcement in policing and prosecuting but the layers of injustice and 
vulnerability mentioned earlier—the role of inadequate defense 
representation323 and of crushing power to plead guilty.324  Poverty may be 
criminogenic (in the sense of making one a “criminal”) not, or not merely, 
because it leads to crime commission but because it leads to inadequate or 
absent lawyers, to government employees (whether police, judges, or 
prosecutors) unrestrained by fear of accountability,325 and to plea bargaining, 
at which one is disadvantaged in every sense.  This disadvantage can stem 
 
 319. At least in the felony context. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 569 (noting that “some 
critics of misdemeanor jurisprudence hold out felony jurisprudence as a salutary alternative 
representing criminal law at its best”). 
 320. See Delgado, supra note 208, at 73 (“Rehabilitation assumes that offenders are ‘sick,’ 
psychologically or morally, and may be required to undergo personality modification to regain 
their health.”). 
 321. See id. 
 322. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1359–60 (“[T]he overcriminalization viewpoint lacks 
two features that might otherwise permit it to better account for the misdemeanor debacle.  
First, overcriminalization does not contemplate actual innocence.  Indeed, one of its central 
complaints is that overbroad codes make everyone guilty.  As Stuntz famously put it, 
overcriminalization means that eventually ‘the law on the books makes everyone a felon.’  It 
may even be that the persuasiveness of the overcriminalization story has caused scholars to 
overlook the fact that many convicted misdemeanants are not guilty at all.  In this way, 
overcriminalization is actually at odds with the innocence revolution.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Stuntz, supra note 202, at 511)). 
 323. See supra Part I.B. 
 324. See supra Part I.A. 
 325. See Bell, supra note 83, at 2125 (“[A]fter getting a plum assignment to an upper-
middle-class, predominantly white neighborhood, [a former police officer] would sometimes 
leave his post to go to a poor, predominantly black neighborhood to make arrests.  He needed 
to meet his expected number of arrests, but even though there were people using drugs and 
committing other crimes in the neighborhood where he was assigned, he knew there would be 
‘trouble’ if he arrested the wrong person.”); David A. Sklansky, The Nature and Function of 
Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 512 (2016) (“Prosecutors seem 
accountable neither to the electorate nor to the legal system.”). 
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from the clout one has with one’s lawyer and with the prosecutor,326 from 
the limits on defense counsel’s resources, influence, experience, and skill,327 
from the assumptions of guilt and feelings of contempt entertained by 
decision makers such as judge, juror, and lawyer,328 from an inability to make 
bail,329 and so on. 
Why does the fusion of legal and factual guilt matter, particularly where 
scholars may be advancing important reform goals and correcting important 
misunderstandings?  Part IV addresses that question. 
C.  Considerations of Role 
In many instances, those working within the criminal system may be 
required to hold back from questioning the reliability of convictions.330  
Thus, it is said that judges, along with others representing “the system,” need 
to project confidence in verdicts.331  
On the other hand, activists and advocates for system reform need to 
simplify, hone, and make clear their messaging with a view to maximizing 
success on the front at which they fight.  This may entail downplaying certain 
other goals or concerns.  So, for example, perhaps you push for “second 
chances” because you realize that this message is more likely to resonate than 
an argument that our criminal system fails to provide much by way of a first 
chance. 
This Article urges reflection on the distinct role of legal scholars.  We are 
(generally) not bound by the rules constraining judges or system 
administrators.  We are not—though some fear the risk332—propagandists 
for the criminal system.  Of course, the legal academy is full of accomplished 
advocates.333  But it is also a unique space for grappling with the uncertain, 
the unknowable, and the conflictual, and for acknowledging areas in which 
data does not exist.  In that spirit, this Article of course concedes that the 
phenomenon of convictions being imposed in the absence of factual guilt is 
not one that can be quantified334 but also asserts that it is unwarranted and 
problematic to infer from this that the concern is nugatory.  After Part III 
explores potential explanations for the fusion described in Part II, Part IV 
addresses its implications. 
 
 326. See Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 19–20 (2016); Janet 
Moore et al., Make Them Hear You:  Participatory Defense and the Struggle for Criminal 
Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1296 (2015). 
 327. See Sklansky, supra note 190, at 29 (“[E]ven a strong prosecution case can fall apart 
in court, particularly when attacked by a good defense attorney.”). 
 328. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1330 n.44. 
 329. See Pinto, supra note 120. 
 330. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 332. See Alice Ristroph, Remarks at the Law and Society Association Annual Conference:  
Law at the Crossroads (June 10, 2018) (event attended by author) (raising the question of 
whether criminal law professors act as system propagandists). 
 333. It also, of course, includes professors who teach clinical law, and who thus may serve 
as advocates within the academy. 
 334. See Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 74 (2003). 
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III.  POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
If it is the case that legal scholars often take as a given the factual guilt of 
those with convictions—despite being on notice of the system’s 
vulnerabilities—one might wonder why.  This Part discusses four possible 
contributing factors:  motivated reasoning, assumptions of guilt that build, 
mergers of act and crime, and a narrow conception of innocence. 
A.  Motivated Reasoning 
Motivated reasoning, meaning “the tendency of people to unconsciously 
process information—including empirical data, oral and written arguments, 
and even their own brute sensory perceptions—to promote goals or interests 
extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand,”335 might fuel the apparent 
fusion of legal and factual guilt, for a variety of reasons. 
First, one is generally drawn to phenomena that facilitate one’s ability to 
get a handle on life, such as closure,336 clarity,337 simplicity,338 and 
measurability.339  If one stares fully at some of the ideas suggested in this 
Article, one has to confront some complexities that might be troubling.  For 
example, that factual guilt versus nonguilt is quite often a distinction that 
does not exist in any objective sense.340  Or that, even where factual guilt 
does exist, its overlap with legal guilt may be a lot smaller than typically 
assumed and that, as a result, the number of defendants who are convicted, 
punished, and subjected to myriad other consequences of conviction in the 
absence of factual guilt is potentially much larger than typically assumed.  
Further still, that the number of people who are not convicted but who have 
committed crimes is potentially huge.341  This would make core criminal law 
concepts, such as “offending,” “guilt,” “rehabilitation,” and “recidivism,” 
 
 335. Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for 
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011). 
 336. See Susan A. Bandes, Closure in the Criminal Courtroom:  The Birth and Strange 
Career of an Emotion, in EDWARD ELGAR RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND EMOTION 
(Susan A. Bandes et al. eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3457952 [https://perma.cc/7YW6-5KDT] (“There is an 
argument to be made that closure isn’t an emotion at all, but rather a set of legal aspirations 
for the conduct of criminal proceedings.”); see also Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations 
of Innocence:  Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 
1404 (2000) (“Both people and institutions need closure if they are to function at all, and the 
most ego-syntonic approach individually and institutionally for all professional participants in 
the criminal justice system is to treat the legally guilty as factually guilty.”). 
 337. See Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5, 9–10 
(stating that a version of innocence embodied by DNA exoneration is appealing because 
“simple categories and clear dichotomies are reassuring”). 
 338. See Findley, supra note 11, at 1207 (“[T]he Innocence Movement has drawn power 
from the simplicity of the wrong-person story of innocence . . . .  [B]ut that story alone . . . 
fails to accommodate the vast majority of innocent people in our justice system.”). 
 339. See Richard A. Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration 
Movement?: The Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 221, at 57, 70 (referring to “the human desire to 
quantify and oversimplify complex social problems”). 
 340. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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more complicated to discuss and teach.  It is simpler to say that our system 
generally works well and that the number of times in which legal guilt does 
not track factual guilt is definable, countable, and bearable.  It is simpler to 
say that we can generally let things rest after the appeals process has played 
out and focus on how to rehabilitate people.  It is simpler to say that we 
generally lock up those who have committed crimes and that we can assess 
their rehabilitation by seeing if they recidivate. 
Second, one may be drawn more strongly to concepts like closure when 
they offer comfort about the state of the criminal system and, in turn, of the 
state of the nation.342  In other words, “just world theory” may be operative 
here343—or at least a “just United States theory.”344  It is more comforting to 
think that those who were subject to conviction, punishment, and other 
consequences had a “first chance” rather than being (in potentially huge 
numbers) the victims of a system where phenomena such as plea bargaining’s 
predominance and the defense’s subordination jeopardize reliability.345  It 
may also be more comforting to think that the “guilty” have been captured 
and thus are not at liberty to “reoffend.” 
Making some of these pressures still more salient is the identity of scholars 
who write about the criminal system.  Most are lawyers, many have worked 
within the criminal system, and all could be said to have achieved 
professional success.  It is news when one of us has a criminal record.346  If, 
 
 342. See Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Courts—a Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 319, 342 (2006) (“How [a] nation defines criminal conduct, the punishments for 
such conduct, and the procedures for determining guilt and innocence go to the root of a 
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 343. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 582 (1998) (“Individuals who subscribe to the just world theory believe 
that ‘people usually get what they deserve.’” (quoting Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just 
World Research and the Attribution Process:  Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1030, 1030 (1978))). 
 344. Alex Kozinski argues that, instead of knowledge of an error rate, “[w]hat we have is 
faith that our system works very well and the errors, when they are revealed, are rare 
exceptions.” Kozinski, supra note 75, at xiv–xv (“Much hinges on retaining this belief:  our 
self image as Americans; the pride of countless judges and lawyers; the idea that we live in a 
just society; confidence in the power of reason and logic; the certainty that none of us or our 
loved ones will face the unimaginable nightmare of unjust imprisonment or execution; belief 
in the incomparable integrity and accuracy of our system of justice; faith that we have 
transcended medieval methods of conviction and punishment so that only those who are guilty 
are punished, and their punishment is humane and proportionate.”). 
 345. See Simon, supra note 24, at 213 (“There is little doubt that this self-assurance in the 
process’s diagnosticity caters to important psychological and societal needs.  For one, people 
tend towards favorable assessments of the prevailing social order, deeming it to be just and 
legitimate.  The mere notion that the state can wreck the lives of innocent people casts a 
disconcerting shadow over the integrity of the system.”); Sklansky, supra note 190, at 29 
(stating that we “pride ourselves on our ‘adversary system’”). 
 346. See, e.g., Katherine Long, Former Bank Robber Helped by Gates Fund Now Professor 
at Georgetown Law School, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:21 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/former-bank-robber-helped-by-gates-fund-now-
professor-at-georgetown-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/57FS-VGL3]; Lyle Moran, Re-
fingerprinting of California Lawyers Turns Up Thousands of Criminal Records, ABOVE L. 
(Mar. 28, 2019, 1:49 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/03/re-fingerprinting-of-california-
lawyers-turns-up-thousands-of-criminal-records/ [https://perma.cc/5K3K-QMJB]. 
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despite your legal training and acumen, you choose not to jump in and reduce 
the lack of counsel for those who are poor, it may be comforting to rest on an 
assumption that everyone gets a lawyer347—and maybe even an effective 
one.348  If you have worked within the criminal system, it may be harder to 
acknowledge the breadth of its vulnerabilities.349  If life has treated you well 
and, perhaps despite your lawbreaking, you have no criminal record,350 you 
may not wish to engage in a vigorous questioning of the extant distribution 
of criminal convictions.351  You may not wish to point out that convictions 
do something other than demarcate the guilty as distinguished from the 
innocent. 
B.  Assumptions That Build 
As I have pointed out in earlier work, even at the point of arrest,352 and 
even prebooking,353 it is common for guilt to be assumed:  note, for example, 
how frequently arrestees are referred to as “offenders.”354  Upon a 
prosecutorial charge, the next significant milestone in a criminal case, one 
finds additional assumptions of guilt355 and, again, observes the liberal use 
of the term “offender”356 even by those committed to system reform357 and 
to challenging premature assumptions of guilt.358  So if we posit a crescendo 
of assumptions as a case moves through the system—one that is fueled by 
education and the media359—it may seem unsurprising that by the point of 
conviction those assumptions hold firm even in the face of the kind of 
vulnerabilities described in Part I. 
 
 347. See Bellacosa, supra note 50, at 39. 
 348. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 122 (2004) (“‘Getting what you pay for’ 
is an accepted fact of life, but justice, we hope, is different, particularly in criminal cases.”). 
 349. See Simon, supra note 24, at 213 (“The prospect of contributing to a wrongful 
conviction poses a personal threat to the psyche of the people involved in its operation.  
Ironically, the prevalent response to threats of this kind is to deny their existence.”). 
 350. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 351. See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 53 (2015) (“Consider the vast 
number of never-arrested people who have committed, but have never been arrested for, 
insurance or tax fraud; driving while intoxicated; possessing or selling illegal drugs; and 
engaging in domestic violence and other assaults.”). 
 352. Roberts, supra note 4, at 989. 
 353. See Anna Roberts, LEAD Us Not into Temptation:  A Response to Barbara Fedders’s 
“Opioid Policing,” 94 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 91, 92 (2019). 
 354. See id. 
 355. See Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 931 n.44 (1995) 
(citing a study that found that a “substantial number” of eligible jurors assume that merely 
because a defendant was accused of a crime, it probably means they are guilty of some crime). 
 356. See Wisconsin SPD Training, Judge Mark Bennett—Addressing Unconscious Implicit 
Bias in Voir Dire, VIMEO at 4:22, https://vimeo.com/163018292 [https://perma.cc/ 
AH7N-LKC4] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“[F]ifty percent of the offenders [as opposed to 
‘defendants’] we try in criminal cases are minority.”). 
 357. See Mark W. Bennett, Getting Clamorous About the Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. ONLINE 1, 13 (2018) (noting “the unfairness created by the silence and prior offender 
penalties” and suggesting reforms). 
 358. See id. at 10 n.59. 
 359. See Kozinski, supra note 75, at xxvii–xxviii. 
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C.  Merger of Act and Crime 
The legal scholarship described in Part I points toward a nuanced view of 
“crime” in which one can recognize the multiple ways in which factors such 
as the predominance of plea bargaining and the subordination of the defense 
may stop defendants from bringing to light their lack of factual guilt.  For 
example, a winning mens rea argument may go unmade360 or an affirmative 
defense that could and should triumph may never be investigated or 
voiced.361  By contrast, the apparent fusion of legal and factual guilt 
described in Part II may be aided by a prevalent pull toward a simpler view 
of crime:  one that focuses on the act component of the crime. 
One commonly sees the act-crime merger in public discourse.362  Thus, for 
example, only some homicides are crimes and only some criminal homicides 
are murders.363  It is not unusual, however, for the reporting of homicide rates 
to betray the assumption that they are crime rates and, indeed, to refer to them 
as “murder rates.”364 
One sees this fusion creeping into legal scholarship, too.  For example, 
among the various definitions given for “factual guilt,” a popular one assigns 
factual guilt where the defendant “committed the act.”365  It is noteworthy 
 
 360. See Francis D. Doucette, Non-appointment of Counsel in Indigent Criminal Cases:  A 
Case Study, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 495, 496–99 (1997) (describing a Massachusetts marijuana 
possession prosecution of two unrepresented defendants and, as part of a list of some of the 
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one advised the two defendants that, since neither one of them had been found in ‘actual 
possession’ of the alleged contraband, the prosecution at trial would have the more difficult 
burden of proving ‘constructive possession,’” and “[n]o one advised the two defendants that 
the evidence of intent to distribute was woefully weak, if not non-existent”). 
 361. See Delgado, supra note 208, at 12–13 (“Generally, a criminal offense is committed 
whenever an action fulfills a crime’s material elements.  Although some would end the inquiry 
here, our system of criminal law recognizes considerations collectively known as defenses.”). 
 362. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1400 
(2004) (“For the police and the public alike, the problem is explaining that a difference exists 
between the fact of the bad act and the finding of guilt necessary to establish culpability.”). 
 363. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 364. See Thomas P. Abt, Opinion, How Not to Respond to the Rising Murder Rate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/opinion/murder-rate-
crime.html [https://perma.cc/4H8S-RR5V] (discussing the rising homicide rate, in contrast to 
the headline). 
 365. See, e.g., William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 845 (1988) 
(noting that an individual is “factually guilty” when she “performed a given act”); Craig 
Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 134, 
136 (2006) (explaining that “[f]actual guilt” is “the actus reus, the physical or behavioral 
component of the criminal act,” and adding that “factual guilt is what most laypersons mean 
when they talk about whether someone is guilty—or in the case of miscarriages of justice and 
subsequent exonerations, whether an ‘innocent’ person has been wrongly convicted”); Larry 
May & Nancy Viner, Actual Innocence and Manifest Injustice, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481, 482 
(2004) (“‘[F]actual innocence’ [is] roughly synonymous for ‘did not commit the act that one 
is accused of having committed.’”); Paul J. Mishkin, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the 
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 81 n.84 (1965) (“As used throughout this 
paper, the term ‘factual guilt’ or more simply ‘guilt’ refers to the individual having done the 
acts which constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
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that this definition has gained so much currency, given that commission of 
the act in and of itself is typically not enough to establish guilt.366  It is as if 
there is a concept of crime, constituted by an act, which is in constant tussle 
with our societal decision to establish via statute that more than just an act is 
needed.367  Indeed, some scholarship openly espouses the view that mens rea 
plays an unhelpful role.368 
It may well seem unlikely that those who did not do the alleged act would 
end up, in more than very small numbers, with convictions.  Thus, if an act 
all too easily comes to equal crime, then it would be understandable if 
concern about widespread occurrence of conviction in the absence of factual 
guilt was rare. 
D.  A Narrow Conception of Innocence 
The tendency to view the act component of a crime as tantamount to the 
crime is part of a tendency to view innocence narrowly.  This narrow view 
may be helped along by the dominance and success of the Innocence 
Movement369 and the tendency to embrace its concept of “innocence.”  This 
concept tends to restrict “innocence” cases to “wrong man” cases.370  If one 
assumes that you need to be the “wrong man” to be innocent371 and that 
“wrong man” kinds of cases generally come to light, then it is understandable 
that one would think that generally what we have when we consider those 
who are convicted are those who committed crimes.  That leaves the rest—
who may be the right man to the extent that there was one—all too vulnerable 
to an assumption that they are not innocent.372 
 
 366. See Natapoff, supra note 189, at 1052 (mentioning the mens rea requirement that 
exists “in all but a handful of cases”). 
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or “unsolved murders.” See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, Yet Another Unsolved Murder Stirs Corsica 
Against Its ‘Mafia,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/ 
world/europe/corsica-unsolved-murders-mafia.html [https://perma.cc/8V56-CGPD].  If we 
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unsolved crime or murder, since it is only in the “solving” that we determine whether there 
was a “crime” or a “murder.” 
 368. See H. L. A. Hart, Crime and the Criminal Law by Barbara Wootton, 74 YALE L.J. 
1325, 1325 (1965) (book review) (“Though [Barbara Wootton’s] first investigations were 
confined to the criminal responsibility of the mentally abnormal her name has now become 
identified with the claim that the whole doctrine of mens rea and the conception of 
responsibility embodied in it is an irrational hindrance to sound social policy:  if, as many 
would admit, the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent crime, the doctrine should be 
eliminated or at least allowed to ‘wither away.’”). 
 369. See Findley, supra note 11, at 1157 n.1 (offering definitions of the Innocence 
Movement). 
 370. See Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 457 
(2001). 
 371. See Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up:  Accuracy and 
Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1060 (2016) 
(contrasting those who are “completely innocent” with those who may have plausible 
defenses). 
 372. See May & Viner, supra note 365, at 482. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
Part III identified tendencies, at least among privileged communities, to 
put a certain amount of faith in the criminal system and to conceptualize guilt 
expansively and innocence narrowly, and suggested that they may contribute 
to the apparent fusion mentioned in Part II.  This Part explores implications 
of this fusion, looking first at why it matters and then at what might be done 
in response. 
A.  Why This Matters 
First, it may be useful to explain what this Article is not saying about why 
this fusion matters.  It is not the point of this Article to say that it is (only) 
the innocent (however broadly defined) about whom one needs to be 
concerned and that if we could just get a close enough match between legal 
and factual guilt we could rest easy in regard to our criminal system.373  Far 
from it.374  Even if legal and factual guilt were as closely matched as possible, 
a huge list of concerns would remain, including excessive use of the criminal 
law;375 police, prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional abuse;376 race- and 
class-based disparities in the application of the criminal law from the point 
of criminalization onward and in the availability of paths away from criminal 
conviction;377 harsh and counterproductive sentencing;378 and harsh and 
counterproductive consequences of arrest, detention, charge, conviction, and 
sentencing.379  Rather, this Article seeks to increase the prominence within 
legal scholarship of reminders that a function of the criminal system viewed 
as central to its work380—matching legal guilt as closely as possible to 
factual—is shaky to an unknown and potentially large extent.381 
It is important to acknowledge these vulnerabilities of the system, whether 
one’s viewpoint is that they are ripe for reform or that they help illustrate the 
structural inequalities that mean that convictions will never equal guilt.  It is 
important not just in service of accurate reflections about the system but also 
in service of accurate reflections about those convicted by it.  Assumptions 
 
 373. Thank you to Jocelyn Simonson for raising points to which this section tries to 
respond. 
 374. See Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 305, 307 (2018) (“Mass incarceration, profound racial and socioeconomic 
disparities, and the burdens of criminal records and collateral consequences, together with 
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 375. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 613. 
 376. See Levin, supra note 52, at 522–23 (mentioning prison conditions and “violent law 
enforcement”). 
 377. See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 42, at 967–68. 
 378. See Epps, supra note 16, at 1117. 
 379. See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 42, at 969 (noting that “long-lasting legal barriers that 
attach to each conviction make it difficult or even impossible for individuals to move past 
their criminal records”). 
 380. See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1386 (describing accuracy of result as “the most 
fundamental goal of the criminal justice system”); Hessick, supra note 53, at 277 (“[O]ur 
criminal justice system exists in order to sort the guilty from the innocent.”). 
 381. See Thomas, supra note 54, at 546. 
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that legal guilt connotes factual guilt are not, of course, racially, ethnically, 
or economically neutral.  Convictions are imposed in disproportionate 
numbers on poor people and people of color.382  To assume that a conviction 
connotes factual guilt is to downplay the threats to reliability posed by, for 
example, the plea’s predominance and defense counsel’s subordination, both 
of which fall more heavily on those exposed to disadvantage because of their 
poverty, race, and/or ethnicity.383  It is problematic to buy into the 
implication embedded in such an assumption—that criminality occurs 
disproportionately among those who are poor and of color—without 
confronting the fact that accurate adjudication is a luxury rarely afforded to 
defendants who are poor and of color.384  And to the extent that to assume 
crime commission is to assume risk and danger, this fusion enhances the 
threats faced by people of color.385  Finally, an assumption that to be free of 
convictions is to have lived a law-abiding life runs the risk of compounding 
“White credit” and reinforcing a sense of white innocence,386 all while 
downplaying the extent to which those endowed with whiteness and/or other 
forms of privilege can avoid findings of guilt.387 
In addition to further jeopardizing those who are targets of race- and class-
based stereotypes, an assumed fusion of those who are convicted with those 
who have committed crimes risks hampering efforts to inspire concern about 
the fate of those with convictions.  Some simply care less about people’s 
suffering or are more desirous of it if they view them as having committed 
crimes.388  And if, as suggested above, part of a reformist agenda is to reduce 
correctional abuse, sentences, and the consequences of convictions and 
sentencing, those efforts may get more traction if care has been taken to resist 
an assumption that all those convicted committed crimes.389 
Finally, there is much need for accuracy within criminal justice analyses, 
and academics have a crucial role to play in helping to enhance it.  From the 
rough-and-ready way in which the criminal system is sometimes described, 
you might not know that lives and lifelong consequences are at stake.  You 
might not know that we are speaking of one of the state’s gravest functions.  
So, arrests get treated as guilt,390 homicides as murders,391 arrest rates as 
 
 382. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 383. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1346. 
 384. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 385. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence:  A Provisional Model of Some of the 
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1508 (2016) (“African-Americans’ exposure to the police occurs 
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 386. See Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 
66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 873–74 (2015). 
 387. For an observation about the ability to buy one’s way out of certain charges and into 
diversion, see King, supra note 220, at 591. 
 388. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 389. See Epps, supra note 16, at 1150 (“If people thought [false convictions] were more 
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 390. See supra notes 352–54 and accompanying text. 
 391. See supra note 364 and accompanying text. 
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crime rates,392 and so on.  In the absence of independent analyses, the state’s 
narrative can easily become the dominant narrative,393 and yet of course the 
state has an interest in legitimatizing itself.  Academia’s role as a source of 
independent, accurate, well-supported criminal justice research is a vital one. 
B.  What Might Be Done 
This section, too, begins with a caveat:  if we are concerned about the 
reinforcement of assumptions about the criminal system and those on whom 
it operates, legal scholarship should, of course, not be the only focus of our 
concern.  In earlier work, I have identified unwarranted assumptions of guilt, 
and unwarranted assumptions about what convictions mean, on the part of 
jurors, prosecutors, defense attorneys, legislators, and judges.394  It would be 
strange to exempt one’s own group, particularly when one’s own group has 
such an important role to play regarding accuracy, detachment, and rigorous 
sourcing.  In what follows, I offer reform suggestions under three headings, 
focusing on statistics, vocabulary, and framing. 
1.  Statistics 
In a variety of areas, an understandable desire for statistical insight into the 
criminal system and its challenges runs the risk of reinforcing assumptions 
of widespread guilt and a narrow definition of innocence.  Even when the 
statistical research itself is cautious, narrow, and explicit about its lack of 
generalizability, those caveats are often lost in later use of the results. 
Thus, for example, as discussed above, many have been eager to try to pin 
a number on the percentage of convictions that are “wrongful.”  When those 
figures are then circulated without caveat as if they represent the proportion 
of those with convictions who are “innocent,” we are at risk of cabining 
reliability concerns and thus of reinforcing the notion that the factual guilt of 
those with convictions can, by and large, be assumed.  We are at risk of losing 
sight, for example, of the broader view of innocence advanced in this Article 
and thus at risk of undermining key parts of criminal law, such as mens rea 
and affirmative defenses,395 and obscuring key parts of our criminal system, 
such as the predominance of plea bargaining and the subordination of the 
defense.  We are also at risk of losing sight of the fact that many winning 
claims of “innocence”—even innocence narrowly defined—may never come 
to light.396  Thus, those describing the prevalence of “wrongful conviction” 
or conviction of the “innocent” should be explicit about what they mean by 
these terms and careful in their use of data. 
 
 392. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 989. 
 393. See id. 
 394. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 395. See Natapoff, supra note 36, at 1357 (“Much legal theory remains devoted to defining 
mens rea and defenses as a way of capturing deep principles of criminal justice.”). 
 396. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, “recidivism rates” are commonly proffered, perhaps because 
they promise to tell us so much about a topic of wide interest.397  But they 
bring a whole range of concerns.398  As I have discussed in earlier work, the 
unquestioned use of arrest as a sign of a “return to criminal conduct” risks 
endorsing an early assumption of guilt.399  And as this Article suggests, to 
assume that a conviction represents “criminal conduct” or a “return to 
criminal conduct” is something that should not be done without caveat.  
“Recidivism” is, therefore, a term whose metrics need to be made explicit, 
and the vulnerabilities of the chosen metrics, as they apply to both alleged 
episode one and two, should be explored, lest silence endorse unwarranted 
assumptions of guilt and of systemic accuracy.400 
2.  Vocabulary 
There are a number of vocabulary items whose use should be complicated 
or abandoned in light of this Article’s arguments.  Several of them are 
independently objectionable.401  For example, terms such as “felon,” 
“criminal,” “murderer,” and “rapist”—even “misdemeanant”—all convey 
labeling and stigma,402 and scholars may avoid them as a result.  But this 
Article suggests an additional reason to jettison them.  One reason that they 
convey stigma is that they convey not just conviction of a crime but 
commission of a crime.  If one comes to doubt the appropriateness of 
assuming the accuracy of a conviction, one may wish to avoid these terms. 
Less obviously stigmatizing, but still highly problematic, is the common 
term “offender” and all its subcategories (“violent,” “nonviolent,” 
“persistent,” “repeat,” “sex,” “juvenile,” and so on).  Again, one may reject 
it because of its labeling effect or its suggestion of essentialism and 
permanence.  But, as mentioned earlier, there is another reason to reject it:  
its definition nestles factual guilt neatly within legal guilt.  And in using it, 
legal scholars seem to follow the dictionary’s lead, gliding from usage that 
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Using Derogatory Language to Describe People in Prison, REWIRE NEWS (Apr. 20, 2015, 
1:53 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2015/04/20/case-using-derogatory-language-describe-
person-prison/ [https://perma.cc/98VZ-FKEU] (noting that even news stories that draw 
attention to criminal system abuses can “undercut[] the humanity of the people featured with 
derogatory phrases” and criticizing terms that include “offender,” “criminal,” “ex-offender,” 
“ex-con,” and “felon”). 
 402. See Ristroph, supra note 41, at 566 (stating that “felonies and felons” are subjected to 
“informal social stigma”). 
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is, or could be, about legal guilt, to usage that seems to suggest an assumption 
of factual guilt.  If the term is preserved, it would be useful for legal scholars 
to be clear about whether in using it they mean “person convicted of a 
crime”403 or “person who committed the crime,” and if they view the latter 
as wrapped up within the former, to be explicit about why. 
Scholars should also be careful and explicit about the definitions of “guilt” 
and “innocence” with which they are working.  Using “factually guilty” to 
refer to someone believed to have committed the alleged act—regardless of 
other components of the alleged crime and defenses—may contribute to the 
wasting away of things like mens rea and affirmative defenses as crucial 
components of our definitions of crime.  Using “innocent” in a way restricted 
to those who are believed not to have committed the alleged act brings the 
same risks. 
As a flip side of these kinds of vocabulary efforts, one should be alert to 
language choices that risk conveying an assumption that those without 
convictions are crime-free.  To perpetuate this assumption is to endorse 
conviction as an appropriate, sufficiently accurate divider between two 
camps.  Thus, instead of referring to those without convictions as those who 
have lived a law-abiding life,404 one could refer to them as people without 
convictions.  So, too, the push for “leniency,” which appears to urge that the 
government be kinder than usual to certain people with convictions, may 
unwittingly further a sense that the system in general works well, in terms of 
both who is convicted and what sentences they receive.405 
These kinds of language choices matter.406  And the desire to explore the 
assumptions that may lie behind current choices, in order to push for different 
choices, has parallels in other reform efforts.  The drive to rename the 
“criminal justice system” the “criminal legal system” is one example.407  So, 
too, is the effort to abandon the description of life-changing,408 and 
sometimes life-threatening, consequences of conviction as “collateral 
consequences.”409 
 
 403. See Pfaff, supra note 116, at 179 (stating that, in his article, “‘drug offender’ refers to 
someone convicted of a drug offense, not someone who commits crimes while on drugs or in 
furtherance of a drug habit, nor someone who commits violent crimes as a result of the 
disruptions caused by drug enforcement”). 
 404. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 405. See Roberts, supra note 353, at 102 (mentioning the risk that discussions of “leniency” 
endorse the notion that the mainstream criminal justice system is normal and fair). 
 406. See Lynch, supra note 173, at 2136 (noting that “the prevailing terminology subtly 
prejudices our thinking”). 
 407. See Carol Jacobsen & Lynn D’Orio, Defending Survivors:  Case Studies of the 
Michigan Women’s Justice & Clemency Project, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 n.12 
(2015). 
 408. See Peter Goldberg, Exec. Dir., Brooklyn Cmty. Bail Fund, Remarks at the Brooklyn 
Historical Society Event:  Petty Crimes and Petty Laws:  A Hard Look at the Broken 
Misdemeanor System (Jan. 28, 2019) (event attended by author) (explaining that so-called 
“collateral consequences” are in fact big, life-changing consequences). 
 409. See id. 
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3.  Keeping the Caveat in Mind 
Finally, those who are persuaded that the vulnerabilities in the system are 
such as to leave a question mark hanging over the extent of its accuracy may 
wish to approach with care the kind of progressive statements mentioned in 
Part II.  Because, yes, a second chance is important, but more important is a 
first; rehabilitation and redemption are good, but only if there was a flaw or 
sin; lenience is welcome, but no punishment is “lenient” in the absence of 
guilt; poverty may be criminogenic (in the sense of making one a “criminal”), 
but part of the “criminogenesis” is that those without money are at risk of 
crushing pressure to plead guilty with no adequate representative to push 
back.  Even as we strive for better treatment for those with convictions, let 
us not erase the risk of convictions without guilt.410 
CONCLUSION 
We have learned lessons from stories of exoneration, but they have been 
too narrow.  They are too often restricted to a certain type of innocence and 
their full implications are too often papered over by assumptions that, in 
general, convictions connote factual guilt.  This Article seeks to emphasize 
the role of legal scholars, both in comprehending the potential breadth of 
innocence and in exploring the breadth of its implications.  It cautions against 
a language of reform that may, even as it strives toward progressive changes, 
reinforce regressive assumptions that convictions equal guilt. 
 
 410. For an analogous proposal, based on an analogous sense that a particular portrayal of 
the criminal justice system can be damaging, see Epps, supra note 16, at 1150 (stating that 
“we should stop asserting that it’s better for many guilty persons to go free to save one 
innocent from punishment and proclaiming that our system complies with that command” and 
adding that “[t]he constant assertions that our system heavily skews errors in favor of 
acquitting the guilty create the impression that false convictions are quite rare and that our 
procedural system is scrupulously fair to the innocent”).  For an analogous suggestion that 
exploration of innocence and other efforts at reform can be “mutually enhancing,” see Roberts, 
supra note 133, at 835. 
